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2.1 Introduction
The propagation impulse framework, which was introduced in eco-
nomics by Frisch (1933) and Slutsky (1937) has come to dominate the
analysis ofeconomic fluctuations. Fluctuationsin economic activity are
seenastheresultofsmall, whitenoiseshocks-impulses-thataffectthe
economy througha complexdynamic propagationsystem.1Much, ifnot
most, empirical macroeconomic investigation has focused on the prop-
agation mechanism. In this paper we focus on the characteristics ofthe
impulses and the implications ofthese characteristicsfor business cycles.
It is convenient, if not completely accurate, to summarize existing
research on impulses as centered on two independent but related ques-
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1. This framework is only one of many that can generate fluctuations. Another one,
which clearly underlies much of the early NBER 'Nork on cycles, is based on floor/
ceiling dynamics, with a much smaller role for impulses. There are probably two reasons
why the white noise impulse-linear propagation framework is now widely used. It is
convenient to use both analytically and empirically, because ofits close relation to linear
time series analysis. Statistical evidence that would allow us to choose between the
different frameworks has been hard to come by.
In the standard dynamic simultaneous equation rnodel, impulses arise from the ex-
ogenous variables and the noise in the system. In the model we employ we do not
distinguish between endogenous and exogenous variables. The entire system is driven
by the innovations (the one step ahead forecast en·ors) in the variables. A portion of
what we call "innovations" would be explained by current movements of exogenous
variables in large macroeconomic models. Forexample, we find large negative "supply"
innovations in late 1974. In a larger model these would be explained by oil import prices.
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tions. The first question concerns the number of sources of impulses:
Is there only one source ofshocks to the economy, or are there many?
Monetarists often single out monetary shocks as the main source of
fluctuations;2 this theme has been echoed recently by Lucas (1977) and
examined empirically by the estimation of index or dynamic factor
analysis models. The alternative view, that there are many, equally
important, sources of shocks, seems to dominate most of the day-to-
day discussions of economic fluctuations.
The second question concerns the way the shocks lead to large fluc-
tuations. Are fluctuations in economic activity caused by an accumula-
tion ofsmall shocks, where each shock is unimportant ifviewed in iso-
lation, orare fluctuations due to infrequent large shocks? The first view
derives theoretical supportfrom Slutsky, who demonstratedthatthe ac-
cumulation ofsmall shocks could generate data that mimicked the be-
havior ofmacroeconomic time series. It has beenforcefully restated by
Lucas (1977). The alternative view is less often articulated but clearly
underlies many descriptions and policy discussions-that there are in-
frequent, large, identifiable shocks that dominate all others. Particular
economicfluctuations canbeascribedtoparticularlargeshocksfollowed
byperiodsduringwhichtheeconomyreturnstoequilibrium. Suchaview
is implicit in the descriptionofspecific periods suchas the Vietnam War
expansion, the oil price recession, orthe Volcker disinflation.
The answers to both questions have important implications for eco-
nomic theory, economic policy, andeconometric practice. We cite three
examples. The role of monetary policy is quite different if shocks are
predominantly monetary orarise partly from policy and partly from the
behavior ofprivate agents. The discussion ofrules versus discretion is
also affected by the nature ofshocks. Ifshocks are small and frequent,
policy rules are clearly appropriate. Ifshocks are instead one ofa kind,
discretion appears more reasonable.3 Finally, ifinfrequent large shocks
are present in economic time series, then standard asymptotic approx-
imations to the distributionofestimators may be poor, androbust meth-
ods ofestimation may be useful.
This paperexaminesbothquestions, usingtwoapproaches to analyze
the empirical evidence. The first is the natural, direct approach, in
which we specify and estimate a structural model. This allows us to
examine the characteristics of the shocks and to calculate their con-
tributions to economic fluctuations. In section 2.2 we discuss the struc-
2. A supplement to the Journal ofMonetary Economics was devoted to the analysis
of the sources of impulses in different countries, using the Brunner/Meltzer approach.
Conclusions vary somewhat across countries, but "measures expressing an unantici-
pated or accelerating monetary impulse figure foremost" (Brunner and Meltzer 1978,
14).
3. A good example of the importance of the nature of the shocks for the rules versus
discretion debate is given by the answers of Lucas and Solow to the question, What
should policy have been in 1973-75? in Fischer 1980.125 Are Business Cycles All Alike?
tural model, the data, and the methodology in detail. In section 2.3 we
present the empirical results. We conclude: that fluctuations are due,
in roughly equal proportions, to fiscal, money, demand, and supply
shocks. We find substantial evidence against the small-shock hypoth-
esis. What emerges, however, is not an economy characterized by large
shocks and a gradual return to equilibrium, but rather an economy with
a mixture of large and small shocks.
Our second approach to analyzing the data is an indirect one, which
tests oneofthe implications ofthe small-shock hypothesis. Ifeconomic
fluctuations arise from an accumulation of srnall shocks, business cycles
must then be, in some precise sense, alike .. We therefore look at how
"alike" they are. The comparative advantage ofthe indirect approach
is that it does not require specification of the structural model; its
comparative disadvantage is that it may have low power against the
large-shock hypothesis. It is very similar to the study by Bums and
Mitchell (1946) of commonality and differences of business cycles.
Instead of focusing on graphs, we focus on correlation coefficients
between variables and an aggregate activity index. Although these cor-
relation coefficients are less revealing than the Burns and Mitchell
graphs, they do allow us to state hypotheses precisely and to carry out
statistical tests. Our conclusions are somewhat surprising: business
cycles are not at all alike. This, however, is not inconsistent with the
small-shock hypothesis, and it provides only mild support in favor of
the view that large specific events dominate individual cycles. These
results cast doubt on the usefulness ofmaking "the business cycle" a
reference frame in the analysis ofeconomic: time series. These results
are developed in section 2.4.
2.2 The Direct Approach: Methodology
2.2.1 The Structural Model
Let X t be the vector of variables of interest. We assume that the
dynamic behavior ofX t is given by the structural model:4
(1)
n
Xt = ~ A;Xt-; + Et
;=0
E(EtE~) = D if t = 'T
ootherwise
where D is a diagonal matrix.
4. We assume that the propagation mechanism is linear and time invariant. Violation
of either of these assumptions would probably lead 1:0 estimated shocks whose distri-
butions have tails thicker than the distribution of the true shocks.126 Olivier J. Blanchard/Mark W. Watson
Our vector Xt includes four variables. Two are the basic macroeco-
nomic variables, the variables ofultimate interest-outputand the price
level. The other two are policy variables. The first is a monetary ag-
gregate, M t , the second is an index offiscal policy. We shall describe
them more precisely below.
The structural model is composed of four equations. The first two
are aggregate demand and aggregate supply. The other two are equa-
tions describing policy; they are policy feedback rules. The vector Et
is the vectoroffour structural disturbances. It includes aggregate sup-
ply and demand disturbances as well as the disturbances in fiscal and
monetary policy. The matrices A;, i = 0, ... , n represent the prop-
agation mechanism.
We assume that the structural disturbances are contemporaneously
uncorrelated and that their covariance matrix, D, is diagonal. How-
ever, we do allow the matrix Ao to differ from zero, so that each
structural disturbance is allowed to affect all four variables contem-
poraneously.
Leaving aside for the movement the issue of identification and es-
timationofequation (1), we now see how we canformalize the different
hypotheses about the nature ofthe disturbances.
2.2.2 Is There a Dominant Source of Disturbances?
There may be no single yes or no answer to this question. A specific
source may dominate short-run movements in output but have little
effect on medium- and long-run movements. One source may dominate
prices movements, another may dominate output movements.
Variance decompositions are a natural set of statistics to use for
shedding light on these questions. These decompositions show the
proportion ofthe K-step ahead forecast error variance ofeach variable
that can be attributed to each ofthe four shocks. By choosing different
values of K, we can look at the effects ofeach structural disturbance
on each variable in the short, medium, and long run.
2.2.3 Are There Infrequent Large Shocks?
A first, straightforward way of answering this question is to look at
the distribution ofdisturbances-or more precisely the distribution of
estimated residuals. The statement that there are infrequent large shocks
can be interpreted as meaning that the probability density function of
each shock has thick tails. A convenient measure of the thickness of
tails is the kurtosis coefficient of the marginal distribution of each
disturbance, E[(Ej/O"j)4]. We shall compute these kurtosis coefficients.
In addition we shall see whether we can relate the large realizations
to specific historical events and fluctuations.127 Are Business Cycles All Alike?
This first approach may, however, be too crude, for at least two
reasons. The first is that a particular sour(;e of shocks may dominate
a given time period, not because of a particular large realization but
because ofa sequence ofmedium-sized realizations ofthe same sign.
The second reason is similar but more subtle. The system character-
ized by equation (1) is highly aggregated. lUnless it can be derived by
exact aggregation-and this is unlikely-it should be thought of as a
low-dimensional representation of the joint behavior of the four vari-
ables Xt. In this case the "structural" disturbances E will be linear
combinations of current and lagged values of the underlying disturb-
ances. An underlying "oil shock" may therefore appear as a sequel}ce
of negative realizations ofthe supply disturbance in equation (1). For
both reasons, we go beyond the computation of kurtosis coefficients.
For each time period we decompose th4~ difference between each
variable and its forecast constructed K periods before, into compo-
nents due to realizations ofeach structural disturbance. Ifwe choose
K large enough, forecast errors mirror major fluctuations in output as
identified by NBER. We can then see whether each of these fluctua-
tions can be attributed to realizations of a. specific structural disturb-
ance, for example, whether the 1973-75 recession is mostly due to
adverse supply shocks.
2.2.4 Identification and Estimation
Our approach to identification is to avoid as much as possible over-
identifying but controversial restrictions. We impose no restrictions on
the lag structure, that is, onAi' i = 1, ... "~no We achieve identification
by restrictions on Ao, the matrix characterizing contemporaneous re-
lations between variables, and by assuming that the covariance matrix
of structural disturbances, D, is diagonal. We now describe our ap-
proach and the data in more detail.
Choice ofVariables
We use quarterly data for the period 1947:1 to 1982:4. Output, the
price level, and monetary and fiscal variables are denoted Y, P, M, and
G, respectively. Output, the price level and the monetary variable are
the logarithms of real GNP, of the GNP deflator and of nominal MI.
The price and money variables are multiplied by four so that all struc-
tural disturbances have the interpretations ofrates ofchange, at annual
rates. The fiscal variable G, is an index that atterrlpts to measure the
effect of fiscal policy-that is, of government spending, deficits, and
debt, on aggregate demand. It is derived from other work (Blanchard
1985) and is described in detail in appendix 2.2.128 Olivier J. Blanchard/Mark W. Watson
Reduced-Form Estimation
Since we impose no restrictions on the lag structure, A;, i = 1, ... ,n,
we can proceed in two steps. The reduced form associated with equa-
tion (1) is given by:
(2)
n




if t = T
if t =1= T
B; = (I - AO)-lA; ; n = [(I - Ao)-l]D[(I - AO)-l]'.
We first estimate the unconstrained reduced form (2). Under the large-
shock hypothesis, some of the realizations of the Et and thus Xt may
be large; we therefore use a method of estimation that may be more
efficient than ordinary least squares (OLS) in this case. We use the
bounded influence method developed by Krasker and Welsch (1982),
which in effect decreases the weight given to observations with large
realizations.5 We choose a lag length, n, equal to 4.6
The vector Xt is the vector ofunexpected movements in Y, P, M, and
G. Let lower-case letters denote unexpected movements in these vari-
ables, so that this first step in estimation gives us estimated time series
for y, p, m, and g.
Structural Estimation
The second step takes us from x to E. Note that equations (1) and
(2) imply:
(3) x = Ao x + E.
Thus, to go from x to E we need to specify and estimate Ao, the set
of contemporaneous relations between the variables. We specify the
following set of relations:
(4) Y bIP + E
S (aggregate supply)
(5) Y b2m b3 P + b4g + Ed (aggregate demand)
(6) g C1Y + C2P + Eg (fiscal rule)
(7) m C3Y + C4P + Em (money rule)
5. LAD or other robust M estimators could also have been used. In some circum-
stances OLS may be more efficient than the robust estimators because of the presence
of lagged values.
6. Each equation in the vector autoregression included a constant and a linear time
trend. When the vector autoregression was estimated without a time trend, the esti-
mated residuals, x, were essentially unchanged.129 Are Business Cycles All Alike?
We have chosen standard specifications for aggregate supply and
demand. Output supplied is a function of the price level.? Output de-
manded is a function of nominal money, the price level, and fiscal
policy; this should be viewed as the reduced form ofan IS-LM model,
so that Cd is a linear combination of the IS and LM disturbances. The
last two equations are policy rules, which allow the fiscal index and
money to respond contemporaneously to output and the price level.8
Even with the zero restrictions onAoimplicit in the equations above,
the system ofequations (4) to (7) is not identified. The model contains
eight coefficients and four variances that rnust be estimated from the
ten unique elements in O. To achieve identification, we use a priori
information on two of the parameters.
Within a quarter, there is little or no discretionary response offiscal
policy to changes in prices and output. Most ofthe response depends
oninstitutional arrangements, such as the structure ofincome tax rates,
the degree and timing of indexation of transfer payments, and so on.
Thus the coefficients Ct and C2 can be constructed directly; the details
ofthe computations are given in appendix 2.2. Using these coefficients,
we obtain f! from equation (6).
Given the two constructed coefficients CI and C2, we now have six
unknown coefficients and four variances to t~stimate using the ten unique
elements in O. The model is just identifit~d. Estimation proceeds as




S are used as instruments in equation (7) to obtain Em. Finally, Eg, E
S
,
and Em are used as instruments in equation (5) to obtain Ed'
The validity ofthese instruments at each stage depends on the plau-
sibility of the assumption that the relevant disturbances are not cor-
related. Although we do not believe this is exactly the case, we find it
plausible that they have a low correlation, so that our identification is
approximately correct.
It may be useful to compare ourmethodfor identifying and estimating
shocks with the more common method used in the vector autoregres-
7. A more detailed specification of aggregate supply, recognizing the effects of the
price of materials would be:
y = dIP - d2(Pm -p)
Pm = d3P + d4y
+ eYS
+ epm,
where supply depends on the price of materials, Pm' and the price level, and where in
tum the nominal price of materials depends on the price level and the level of output.
The two equations have, however, the same specifica.tion, and it is therefore impossible
to identify separately the shocks to the price of materials and to supply epm and eYS •
Equation (4) is therefore the solved-out version of this two-equation system, and eS is
a linear combination ofthese two shocks.
8. If money supply responds to interest rates directly rather than to output and
prices, em and ed will both depend partly on money demand shocks and thus will be
correlated. Our estimation method will then attribute as much of the variance as pos-
sible to em and incorporate the residual in Ed.130 Olivier J. Blanchard/Mark W. Watson
sion literature. A common practice in that literature is to decompose,
as we do, the forecast errors into a set of uncorrelated shocks. There
the identification problem is solved by assuming that the matrix (I -
Ao) is triangular orcan be made triangular by rearranging its rows. This
yields a recursive structure that is efficiently estimated by OLS. We
do not assume a recursive structure but rather impose four zero re-
strictions in addition to constructing two coefficients Ct and Cz. Our
method produces estimated disturbances much closerto true structural
disturbances than would be obtained by imposing a recursive structure
on the model.
2.3 The Direct Approach: Results
2.3.1 Reduced-Form Evidence
The first step is the estimation ofthe reduced form given by equation
(2). The estimated Bj, i = 1, ... , 4 are of no particular interest. The
estimated time series corresponding to unexpected movements ofx-
that is of y, m, p, and g-are of more interest. Table 2.1 gives, for y,
m, p, and g, the value of residuals larger than 1.5 standard deviations
in absolute value, as well as the associated standard deviation and
estimated kurtosis.
The kurtosis coefficient ofa normally distributed random variable is
equal to 3. The 99% significance level ofthe kurtosis coefficient, for a
sample of 120 observations drawn from a normal distribution, is 4.34.
Thus, ignoring the fact that these are estimated residuals rather than
actual realizations, three ofthe four disturbances have significantly fat
tails. Since linear combinations ofindependent random variables have
kurtosis smaller than the maximum kurtosis of the variables them-
selves, this strongly suggests large kurtosis of the structural disturb-
ances.9 We now turn to structural estimation.
2.3.2 The Structural Coefficients
The second step is estimation of Ao, from equations (4) to (7). We
use constructed values for Ct and Cz of - 0.34 and - 1.1 respectively.
Unexpected increases in output increase taxes more than expenditures
and lead to fiscal contraction. Unexpected inflation increases real taxes
but decreases real expenditures, leading also to fiscal contraction. We
are less confident of cz, the effect of inflation, than we are of Ct. In
9. A more precise statement is the following: Let Xl and X 2 be independent variables
with kurtosis K I and K 2 , one of which is greater than or equal to 3. Then ifZ is a linear
combination of Xl and X 2 , Kz ~ max (K.,K2). We do not, however, assume indepen-
dence but only assume zero correlation of the structural disturbances.131 Are Business Cycles All Alike?
Table 2.1 Large Reduced-Form DisturbancE~s










































Standard error .0085 .0431 .0244 .0182
Kurtosis 4.0 10.2 8.6 8.2
Note: Ratios of residuals to standard errors are reported.132 Olivier J. Blanchard/Mark W. Watson
appendix 2.1 we report alternative structural coefficient estimates based
on C2 = -1.3 and C2 = -1.0.
The results of estimating equations (4) to (7) are reported in table
2.2. All coefficients except one are ofthe expected sign. Nominal money
has a negative contemporaneous effect on output; this is consistent
with a positive correlation between unexpected movements in money
and output because of the positive effect of output on money supply.
Indeed the correlation m and y is .32. (Anticipating results below, we
find that the effect of nominal money on output is positive after one
quarter.) Aggregate supply is upward sloping; a comparison with the
results of table 2.A.1 suggests that the slope of aggregate supply is
sensitive to the value of C2.
Given our estimates of the reduced form and of Ao, we can now
decompose each variable (Y, P, M, G) as the sum of four distributed
lags ofeach ofthe structural disturbances ed, e
S
, em, and eg • Technically,
we can compute the structural moving average representation of the
system characterized by equation (1).
2.3.3 One or Many Sources of Shocks? Variance Decomposition
Does one source of shocks dominate? We have seen that a natural
way of answering this question is to characterize the contribution of
each disturbance to the unexpected movement in each variable. We
define unexpected movementas the difference betweenthe actual value
ofa variable and the forecast constructed K periods earlier using equa-
tion (1). We use three values ofK. The first case, K = 1, decomposes
the variance ofy, p, m, and g into theirfour components, the variances
ofed, e
S
, em and eg • Theothertwo values, K = 4andK = 20, correspond
to the medium run and the long run respectively.
The results are reported in table 2.3. Demand shocks dominate output
in the short run; supply shocks dominate price in the short run. In the






g = -.34y - 1.1p




y = - .10p - .20m + .06g




acoefficients constructed, not estimated.
bt-statistics in parentheses.133 Are Business Cycles All Alike?





Y - E_1Y .03 .19 .04 .74
G - E_1G .78 .14 .00 .08
M - E_1M .01 .01 .74 .25
P - E_1P .01 .74 .01 .24
Four quarters ahead
Y - E_4Y .15 .16 .16 .54
G - E_4G .70 .13 .00 .16
M - E_4M .13 .03 .67 .17
P - E_4P .01 .6.5 .01 .33
Twenty quarters ahead
Y - E_20Y .27 .20 .17 .37
G - E_20G .66 .12 .05 .17
M - E_20M .28 .04 .64 .05
P - E_20P .15 .22 .36 .26
medium and long run, however, all four shocks are important in ex-
plaining the behavior ofoutput and prices. There is no evidence in
support of the one dominant source of shocks theory.
2.3.4 Are There Infrequent Large Shocks? I
Table 2.4 reports values and dates for all estimated realizations of
ed,es,em and eg larger than 1.5 times their respective standard deviation.
We can compare these with traditional, informal accounts ofthe history
of economic fluctuations since 1948 and see whether specific events
that have been emphasized there correspond to large realizations. A
useful, concise summary of the events associated with large postwar
fluctuations is contained in table 1.1 in the paper by Eckstein and Sinai
in this volume (chap. 1).
The first major expansion in our sample, from 1949:4 to 1953:2, is
usually explained both by fiscal shocks associated with the Korean War
and by a sharp increase in private spending. We find evidence ofboth
in 1951 and in 1952. From 1955 to the early 1970s, large shocks are
few and not easily interpretable. There are, for example, no large shocks
to either fiscal policy or private spending corresponding to either the
Kennedy tax cut or the Vietnam War. In the 1970s, major fluctuations
are usually explained by the two oil shocks. There is some evidence
in favor of this description. We find two large supply shocks in 1974:4
and 1975:1; we also find large fiscal and large demand shocks during134 Olivier J. Blanchard/Mark W. Watson
Table 2.4 Large Structural Disturbances













































1982:4 3.7135 Are Business Cycles All Alike?
the same period. The two recessions of the early 1980s are usually
ascribed to monetary policy. We find substantial evidence in favor of
this description. There are large shocks to money supply for most of
the period 1979:2 to 1982:4 and two very large negative shocks in 1980:2
and 1981:3.
The overall impression is therefore one of infrequent large shocks,
but not so large as to dominate all others and the behavior ofaggregate
variables for long periods. To confirm this impression, we report the
kurtosis coefficients ofthe structural disturbances in table 2.5A; in all
cases we can reject normality with high confidence. In table 2.5B we
use another descriptive device. We assunle that each structural dis-
turbance is an independent draw from a mixed normal distribution, that
is for x = g, d, s, or m:
with probability 1 - Px
with probability Px
where
The realization of each disturbance is drawn either from a normal
distribution with large variance, with probability P, or from a normal
distribution with small variance, with probability 1 - P. The estimated
values of (Jlx' (J2x, Px , estimated by maximum likelihood, are reported
in table 2.5B. The results suggest large, but not very large, ratios of
the standard deviation oflarge to the standard deviation ofsmall shocks;
they also suggest infrequent, but not very infrequent, large shocks.
The estimated probabilities imply that one out of six fiscal or money
shocks and one out of three supply or deInand shocks carne from the
large variance distributions.
Table 2.5 Characteristics of Structural Disturbances
A. Estimated kurtosis Eg E
S Em Ed
K 7.0 5.4 5.9 4.6
B. Disturbances as mixed normals
0'1 .68 .63 .72 .68
(.08)a (.10) (.09) (.13)
0'2 2.01 1.62 1.97 1.50
(.64) (.41) (1.03) (.41)
Ratio 2.95 2.57 2.73 2.21
Probability .15 .27 .14 .30
(.09) (.15) (.15) (.22)
aStandard errors in parentheses.136 Olivier J. Blanchard/Mark W. Watson
The dating of the large shocks in table 2.4 suggests two more char-
acteristics of shocks. First, large shocks tend to be followed by large
shocks, suggesting some form of autoregressive conditional hetero-
skedasticity as discussed in Engle (1982). Second, there seems to be
some tendency for large shocks to happen in unison. In 1950:1, for
example, we find large fiscal, supply, and demand shocks, whereas in
1980:3 we find large supply, money, and demand shocks. To confirm
these impressions we present in table 2.6 the correlations and first
autocorrelations between the squares of the structural shocks. 10 The
table shows a large positive contemporaneous correlation between the
square of the supply shock and the square of the demand shock. A
weaker contemporaneous relationship between supply and the fiscal
shock is present. The squares of all shocks are positively correlated
with their own lagged values; there is also significant correlation be-
tweendemand, the lagged fiscal and supply shocks, and the fiscal shock
and lagged supply shock. All in all, these results suggest an economy
characterized by active, volatile periods followed by quiet, calm pe-
riods, both of varied duration.
2.3.5 Are There Infrequent Large Shocks? II
We discussed in section 2.2 the possibility that a specific source of
shocks may dominate some episode of economic fluctuations, even if
there are no large realizations ofthe shock. To explore this possibility,
we construct an unexpected output series, where the expectations are
the forecasts ofoutput based on the estimated model corresponding to
equation (1), eight quarters before. We chose eight quarters because
the troughs and peaks in this unexpected output series correspond
closely to NBER troughs and peaks. We then decompose this forecast
Table 2.6 Correlations between Squares of Structural Disturbances
(eg)2 (es)2 (effi)2 (ed)2




(e~J)2 .33 .43 .00 .33
(e~J)2 .35 .38 .03 .13
(e'!!J)2 .02 -.09 .23 .21
(e~J)2 .15 .08 .13 .16
10. Although the contemporaneous correlation between the levels ofthe shock is zero
by construction, the same is not true of the squares of the shocks.137 Are Business Cycles All Alike?
error for GNP into components due to each of the four structural
disturbances. This decomposition is repres1ented graphically in figure
2.1; the corresponding time series are given in table 2.A.2 in appendix
2.1.
No single recession can be attributed to only one source of shock.
Post-war recessions appear to be due to the combination of two or
three shocks. The 1960:4 trough, for example, where the GNP forecast
error is - 6.7%, is attributed to a fiscal shock component (-2.4%), a
supply shock component (-1.1%), a money shock component (-1.7%),
and a demand shock component (-1.4%). The 1975:1 trough, where
the GNP forecast error is also -6.7%, seems to have a large supply
shock component (-3.6%) and a demand shock component (-2.9%).
The 1982:4 trough, where the GNP forecast error is - 4.5%, is decom-
posed as -1.4% (fiscal), 1.1% (supply), -1.4% (money), and -2.8%
(demand).
To summarize the results ofthis section, \\i'e find substantial evidence
against the single source of shock hypothesis. We find some evidence
of large infrequent shocks; however, they do not seem to dominate
economic fluctuations.
2.4 The Indirect Approach
Ifeconomic fluctuations are due to an accumulation ofsmall shocks,
then in some sense business cycles should all be alike. In this section
we make precise the sense in which cycles should be alike and examine
the empirical evidence.
The most influential contribution to the position that cycles are alike
is the empirical work carried out by Burns and Mitchell (1946) on pre-
World War II data. Their work focused not only on the characteristic
cyclical behavior ofmany economic variables but also on how, in spe-
cific cycles, the behavior of these variables differed from their char-
acteristic cyclical behavior. Looking at their graphs, one is impressed
at how similar the behaviorofmost variables is across different cycles;
this is true not only ofquantities, for which it may notbe too surprising,
but also, for example, of interest rates.
We considered extending the Burns/Mitchell graph method to the
eight postwar cycles but decided against it. l\1any steps ofthe method,
and in particular their time deformation, are judgmental rather than
mechanical. As a result, it is impossible to derive the statistical prop-
erties oftheir results. When comparing the graphs ofshort rates across
two cycles, for example, we have no statistical yardstick to decide
whether they are similar or significantly different. As a result also, we
do not know which details, in the wealth of details provided in these
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Therefore we use an approach that is in the spirit of Burns and
Mitchell but allows us to derive the statistical properties of the esti-
mators we use. The trade-off is that the statistics we give are much
less revealing than the Burns/Mitchell graphs. Our approach is to com-
pute the cross-correlations at different leads and lags between various
variables and a reference variable such as G~~P, across different cycles.
2.4.1 The Construction of Correlation Coefficients
The first step is to divide the sample into subsamples. We adopt the
standard division into cycles, with trough points determined by the
NBER chronology. This division may not be, under the large-shock
hypothesis, the most appropriate, since a large shock may well dom-
inate parts of two cycles. It is, however, the least controversial. De-
fining the trough-to-trough period as a cycle.t there are seven complete
cycles for which we have data; their dates are given in table 2.7. This
gives us seven subsamples.
For each subsample, we compute cross-correlations at various leads
and lags between the reference variable and the variable considered.
Deterministic seasonality is removed from all variables before the cal-
culation of the correlations. A more difficult issue is that of the time
trend: the series may be generated either by a deterministic time trend
or by a stochastic time trend or by both. In the previous two sections,
this issue was unimportant in the sense that inclusion or exclusion of
a deterministic trend together with unconstrained lag structures in the
reduced form made little difference to estimated realizations of the
disturbances. Here the issue is much more important. Computing de-
viations from a single deterministic trend for the whole sample may be
very misleading if the trend is stochastic. ()n the other hand, taking
first or second differences of the time series probably removes non-
stationarities associated with a stochastic trend, but correlations be-
tween first or second differences of the time series are difficult to
interpret.
In their work, Burns and Mitchell adopt an agnostic and flexible
solution to that problem: they compute deviations ofthe variables from
subsample means. Thus they proxy the time trend by a step function.
Although this does not capture the time trend within each subsample,
it does imply that across subsamples, the estimated time trend will
track the underlying one. We initially follo\\'ed Burns and Mitchell in
their formalization but found this procedure to be misleading for vari-
ables with strong time trends. During each subsample, both the ref-
erence and the other variable are below their means at the beginning
and above their means at the end; this generates spuriously high cor-
relation between the variables. We modify the Burns/Mitchell proce-
dure as follows: for each subsample, we allow for both a level and a140 Olivier J. Blanchard/Mark W. Watson
time trend; the time trend is given by the slope ofthe line going from
trough to trough. This should be thought of as a flexible (perhaps too
flexible) parameterization of the time trend, allowing for six level and
slope changes over the complete sample.
The cross-correlations are then computed for deviations of each of
the two series from its trend. We compute correlations ofthe reference
variable and of the other variable, up to two leads and lags.
2.4.2 The Construction of Confidence Levels
For each variable we calculate cross-correlations with our reference
variable, GNP, for each of the seven cycles. We then want to answer
the following questions: Should we be surprised by the differences in
estimated correlation across cycles? More precisely, under the null
hypothesis that fluctuations are due to the accumulation ofsmall shocks,
how large are these differences in the correlation coefficients likely to
be? Thus, we must derive the distribution of the differences between
the largest and smallest correlation coefficients, at each lag or lead for
each variable. This distribution is far too difficult to derive analytically;
instead we rely on Monte Carlo simulations.
The first step is to estimate, for each variable, the bivariate process
generating the reference variable and the variable under consideration.
We allow for four lags ofeach variable and a linear time trend, for the
period 1947:1 to 1982:4. The method of estimation is, for the same
reasons as in section 2.2, Krasker-Welsch.
The second step is to simulate the bivariate process, using disturb-
ances drawn from a normal distribution for disturbances. (Thus we
implicitly characterize the "small-shock" hypothesis as a hypothesis
that this joint distribution is normal.) We generate 1,000 samples of 147
observations each. We then divide each sample into cycles by identi-
fying troughs in the GNP series. Let Xt denote the log of real GNP at
time t. Time t is a trough if two conditions are satisfied. The first is
that Xt-l > X t < Xt+l < X t+2 < X t+3, and the second that X t be at least
0.5 % below the previous peak value of x. The first ensures that ex-
pansions are longerthan three periods, and the secondeliminates minor
downturns. (When applied to the actual sample, this rule correctly
identifies NBER troughs, except for two that differ from the NBER
trough by one quarter.) Given this division into cycles, we compute,
as in the actual sample, cycle-specific correlations and obtain, for each
ofthe 1,000 samples, the difference betweenthe largestand the smallest
correlation. Finally, bylooking atthe 1,000 samples, we getanempirical
distribution for the differences.
What we report in table 2.7 for each variable and for correlations at
each lead and lag are probabilities that in the corresponding empirical
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exceeds the value of this difference in the actual sample. This proba-
bility is denoted p. A very small value ofp indicates that the difference
observed in the actual sample is surprisingly large under the small-
shock hypothesis. It would therefore be e:vidence against the small-
shock hypothesis.
2.4.3 The Choice of Variables
Most quantity variables, such as consumption or investment, ap-
pear highly correlated with real GNP. Most of the models we have
imply that it should be so, nearly irrespective ofthe source of shocks.
Most models imply that correlations of prices and interest rates with
GNP will be of different signs depending on the source of shocks.
We report results for various prices, inter,est rates, policy variables,
and quantities.
We look at three real wages. In all three cases, the numerator is the
same, the index of average hourly earnings of production and nonsu-
pervisory workers, adjusted for overtime and interindustry shifts, in
manufacturing. In table 2.7A, the wage is dt~flated by the GNP deflator.
In table 2.7B, it is deflated by the CPI and is therefore a consumption
real wage. In table 2.7C, it is deflated by the producer price index for
manufacturers and is therefore a product ~'age. In all three cases, we
take the logarithm of the real wage so constructed.
We then look at two relative prices. Both are relative prices of ma-
terials in terms of finished goods. Because of the two oil shocks, we
consider two different prices. The first is thle ratio ofthe price ofcrude
fuel to the producer price index for finisht~d goods and is studied in
table 2.7D. Table 2.7E gives the behavior of the price of nonfood,
nonfuel materials in terms offinished goods.
We then look at the behavior of interest rates. Table 2.7F charac-
terizes the behaviorofthe nominal three month treasury bill rate. Table
2.7G gives the behavior of Moody's AAA corporate bond yield.
We consider the two policy variables: the fiscal index defined in
the first section, and nominal MI' The results are given in tables 2.7H
and I.
Finally, we consider three quantity variables. Table 2.7J shows the
behavior of real consumption expenditures. Table 2.7K and L shows
the behavior of nonresidential and residential investment.
2.4.4 General Results
In looking at table 2.7, there are two types of questions we want
to answer. The first is not directly the subject of the paper but is
clearly of interest. It is about the typical behavior of each variable
in the cycle. The answer is given for each variable by the sequence
of average correlation coefficients at the different lags and leads.142 Olivier J. Blanchard/Mark W. Watson
Table 2.7 Correlations
Cycle Trough to Trough Peak
1 1949:4 to 1954:2 1953:2
2 1954:2 to 1958:2 1957:3
3 1958:2 to 1961:1 1960:2
4 1961:1 to 1970:4 1969:4
5 1970:4 to 1975:1 1973:4
6 1975:1 to 1980:2 1979:4
7 1980:2 to 1982:4 1981:2
Pi = correlation between tpe reference variable, logarithm of real GNP at time t, and
the other variable at time t + i.
Real Wages
A. Real wage in terms of the GNP deflator (in log)
Cycle P-2 P-l Po P+l P+2
1 - .81 -.70 -.36 -.25 .09
2 -.06 -.41 -.48 - .18 .44
3 - .17 .02 .03 -.35 -.59
4 - .11 - .13 -.01 -.04 -.00
5 .85 .90 .90 .65 .37
6 .75 .84 .84 .75 .63
7 .62 .61 .06 -.29 - .38
Average - .15 -.16 .14 .04 .08
Difference 1.67 1.61 1.38 1.10 1.22
p .04 .07 .27 .65 .52
B. Real wage in terms of the CPI (in log)
Cycle P-2 P-l Po P+l P+2
1 -.53 - .58 - .57 -.64 -.57
2 .09 .44 .79 .85 .76
3 -.15 .29 .75 .47 -.07
4 .56 .57 .63 .56 .49
5 .84 .67 .47 .02 - .31
6 .78 .89 .88 .78 .65
7 .57 .32 -.31 -.53 -.24
Average .30 .37 .37 .21 .10
Difference 1.37 1.47 1.45 1.49 1.34
p .48 .31 .32 .22 .49
C. Real wage in terms of the PPI (in log)
Cycle P-2 P-l Po P+l P+2
1 -.68 - .71 -.63 -.55 -.28
2 .17 .60 .91 .88 .63
3 -.29 .45 .87 .62 .27
4 -.46 -.56 -.62 -.72 -.76
5 .88 .74 .52 .08 - .27
6 .78 .86 .82 .71 .59
7 -.42 -.70 -.72 -.60 .01
Average -.02 .09 .16 .06 .02
Difference 1.57 1.57 1.62 1.61 1.40
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liIble 2.7 (continued)
Relative Prices
D. Relative price of crude fuels in terms of finished goods (in log)
Cycle P-2 P-l Po P+l P+2
1 -.65 -.61 -.45 -.43 -.19
2 -.25 -.04 .09 .31 .41
3 -.07 .45 .42 .46 .17
4 -.61 -.75 -.86 -.91 -.91
5 -.66 -.86 - .91 -.81 -.63
6 .47 .46 .35 .34 .44
7 -.56 -.39 -.23 -.16 -.01
Average -.33 -.24 -.22 -.17 -.10
Difference 1.13 1.33 1.33 1.37 1.35
p .56 .39 .39 .30 .38
E. Relative price of nonfoodlnonfuel materials in terms offinished goods (in log)
Cycle P-2 P-l Po P+l P+2
1 .62 .66 .56 .30 -.12
2 .17 .69 .92 .78 .51
3 .32 .75 .89 .64 .24
4 .09 .06 .02 -.16 -.35
5 -.06 .28 .62 .82 .89
6 -.75 -.77 -.58 -.40 -.23
7 -.02 .59 .92 .82 .32
Average .05 .32 .47 .40 .18
Difference 1.38 1.53 1.51 1.22 1.24
p .32 .16 .15 .37 .56
Interest Rates
F. Three-month treasury bill rate
Cycle P-2 P-l Po P+l P+2
1 -.20 .22 .68 .86 .88
2 -.30 .02 .56 .83 .84
3 -.29 .33 .71 .83 .67
4 -.15 -.01 .20 .36 .49
5 -.26 .05 .40 .69 .84
6 -.56 -.42 -.07 -.23 .39
7 -.42 .41 .71 -.58 -.46
Average -.31 .60 .45 .62 .65
Difference .41 .83 .79 .62 .49
p .94 .64 .70 .77 .88
G. AAA corporate bonds yield
Cycle P-2 P-l Po P+l P+2
1 -.54 -.03 .44 .66 .70
2 -.65 -.35 .16 .32 .38
3 .12 .69 .90 .69 .29
4 -.79 -.71 -.62 -.48 -.30
5 -.88 -.73 - .52 -.08 .19
6 -.82 -.87 -.68 -.48 -.29
7 -.72 -.10 .42 .62 .80
Average -.61 -.30 .01 .17 .25
Difference 1.00 1.56 1.58 1.17 1.11
p .55 .13 .2.5 .63 .67




Cycle P-2 P-l Po P+l P+2
1
2 -.49 - .31 -.03 .12 .58
3 -.43 -.74 -.89 -.67 -.32
4 .73 .45 -.01 -.46 -.74
5 .40 .36 .28 .14 .04
6 - .10 -.20 -.35 -.67 -.63
7 .51 -.08 -.55 -.54 -.47
Average .09 -.07 -.22 -.29 -.22
Difference 1.22 1.19 1.17 .81 1.32
p .56 .61 .70 .92 .51
I. Nominal money, log of MI
Cycle P-2 P-l Po P+l P+2
1 .07 .44 .71 .76 .67
2 .59 .94 .92 .53 .02
3 .68 .73 .69 .40 -.08
4 -.46 - .38 - .31 -.17 -.05
5 .71 .88 .94 .80 .50
6 .08 .23 .53 .64 .74
7 .83 .87 .43 .11 - .16
Average .35 .53 .56 .44 .23
Difference 1.29 1.32 1.25 .97 .90
p .23 .14 .21 .65 .89
Quantity Variables
J. Logarithm of real consumption expenditures
Cycle P-2 P-l Po P+l P+2
1 .22 .35 .32 -.02 -.46
2 .47 .78 .97 .72 .23
3 -.03 .61 .90 .84 .33
4 .69 .78 .88 .91 .90
5 .87 .96 .88 .59 .26
6 .69 .83 .96 .76 .60
7 .39 .86 .91 .40 -.03
Average .47 .74 .83 .60 .26
Difference .90 .61 .65 .93 1.36
p .73 .69 .42 .54 .35
K. Logarithm of real residential investment expenditures
Cycle P-2 P-l Po P+l P+2
1 .34 .18 -.09 -.49 -.82
2 .77 .71 .55 -.00 -.50
3 .31 .78 .92 .65 .08
4 .02 -.01 -.11 -.29 -.47
5 .91 .88 .78 .43 - .01
6 .73 .86 .94 .73 .52
7 .72 .93 .68 .16 -.37
Average .54 .62 .52 .17 - .22
Difference .91 .94 1.05 1.21 1.34
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Table 2.7 (continued)
L. Logarithm of real nonresidential investment expenditures
Cycle P-2 P-I Po PI P2
1 .30 .50 .63 .39 -.19
2 .02 .45 .86 .90 .75
3 -.65 -.23 .28 .81 .84
4 .75 .83 .89 .91 .87
5 .38 .68 .92 .97 .89
6 .39 .53 .77 .88 .89
7 -.58 .08 .64 .88 .84
Average .09 .41 .71 .82 .70
Difference 1.40 1.06 .64 .58 1.08
p .15 .41 .52 .53 .39
How do these sequences relate to Burns/~ditchell graphs? The rela-
tion is roughly the following: if the sequence is flat and close to zero,
the variable has little cyclical behavior. If the sequence is flat and
positive, the variable is procyclical, peaking at the cycle peak; if flat
and negative, it is countercyclical, reaching its trough at the cycle
peak.
If the sequence is not flat, the variable has cyclical behavior but
reaches its peak, or its trough if countercyclical, before or after the
cyclical peak. If, for example, P-l is large and negative, this suggests
that the variable is countercyclical, reaching its trough one quarter
before the cyclical peak. As expected, the quantity variables are
procyclical; there seems to be a tendency for nonresidential invest-
ment to lag GNP by one quarter and residential investment to lead
GNP by one quarter. We find little averagc~ cyclical behavior of real
wages. Relative fuel prices and long-term interest rates are counter-
cyclical and lead GNP by at least two quarters. Relative nonfood!
nonfuel materials and short-term rates appear to be procyclical. We
now tum to the second question, which is one of the subjects of this
paper. How different are the correlations, and are these differences
surprising?
The first part of the answer is that correlations are very different
across cycles. This is true both for variables with little cyclical be-
havior, such as the real wage, and for variables that vary cyclically,
such as nominal rates. These differences suggest that business cycles
are indeed not all alike. The second part ofthe answer may, however,
also be surprising: it is that under the small-shock hypothesis, such
differences are not unusual. For most correlations and most variables,
the p values are not particularly small. Thus the tentative conclusion
of this section is that, although business (;ycles are not very much
alike, their differences are not inconsistent with the hypothesis ofthe146 Olivier J. Blanchard/Mark W. Watson
accumulation of small shocks through an invariant propagation
mechanism.
2.5 Conclusions
In sections 2.2 and 2.4 we specified and estimated a structural model
that allowed us to directly investigate the properties ofshocks and their
role in economic fluctuations. From this analysis we conclude that
fluctuations are due, in roughly equal proportions, to fiscal, money,
demand, and supply shocks. We find substantial evidence against the
small-shock hypothesis. What emerges, however, is not an economy
characterized by large shocks and a gradual return to equilibrium, but
rather an economy with a mixture oflarge and small shocks.
In section 2.4 we investigated the influence of shocks on economic
fluctuations in an indirect way by examining stability of correlations
betweendifferent economic variables across all ofthe postwarbusiness
cycles. Here we found that correlations were very unstable-that busi-
ness cycles were not at all alike. This, however, is not inconsistent
wtih the small-shock hypothesis and provides only mild support for
the view that large specific events dominate the characteristics of in-
dividual cycles. These results cast doubt on the usefulness of using

















g = - .34y - 1.3p
m= 1.20y + .22p
y = .45y
y = .09g - .10m - .40p
Eg Em E
S Ed
.041 .024 .011 .014
g = - .34y - 1.0p
m= 1.52y + .14p
Y = 1.40p
y = .05g - .10m - .09p
Eg Em E
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Table 2.A.2 Decomposition of Eight-Quarter Forecast Errors for GNP
Date GNP Eg Es Em Ed
1950:1 -0.31 0.53 1.72 -0.17 -2.40
1950:2 1.09 0.29 1.12 0.11 -0.43
1950:3 1.99 -1.68 -0.30 0.16 3.81
1950:4 2.56 -0.76 -2.15 0.01 5.46
1951:1 2.44 0.41 -4.10 -0.27 6.41
1951:2 2.52 1.31 -3.59 -0.39 5.19
1951:3 3.65 2.07 -2.37 0.29 3.66
1951:4 3.05 2.83 -2.06 0.40 1.88
1952:1 1.33 1.39 -2.74 1.55 1.13
1952:2 4.47 4.55 -1.99 2.02 -0.12
1952:3 7.00 4.82 -0.62 2.97 -0.17
1952:4 8.85 5.16 -0.27 3.14 0.81
1953:1 9.98 4.65 1.51 2.70 1.12
1953:2 6.31 3.47 0.44 1.46 0.94
1953:3 2.81 2.85 -0.39 0.47 -0.12
1953:4 1.10 3.09 0.50 -0.85 -1.64
1954:1 -0.39 4.14 -0.56 -1.41 -2.56
1954:2 -2.66 3.27 -0.66 -1.64 -3.62
1954:3 -2.76 1.79 0.25 -1.53 -3.26
1954:4 -0.75 1.17 0.75 -0.70 -1.96
1955:1 0.44 0.03 0.54 0.00 -0.14
1955:2 0.83 -0.55 0.37 0.31 0.70
1955:3 2.08 -0.64 0.75 0.55 1.42
1955:4 1.12 -1.24 0.57 0.32 1.48
1956:1 0.64 -2.01 1.62 -0.21 1.24
1956:2 0.76 -1.60 1.44 -0.34 1.27
1956:3 -0.21 -1.26 0.47 -0.59 1.18
1956:4 0.78 -1.04 0.47 -0.70 2.04
1957:1 0.85 -1.37 0.24 -0.69 2.67
1957:2 0.74 -1.04 0.45 -0.80 2.13
1957:3 0.25 -1.55 0.04 -0.70 2.45
1957:4 -1.44 -1.13 -0.13 -0.86 0.69
1958:1 -4.20 -0.86 -0.54 -1.44 -1.35
1958:2 -4.48 -0.86 -0.55 -1.38 -1.69
1958:3 -2.85 -0.57 -0.25 -0.57 -1.46
1958:4 -1.07 0.30 -0.58 -0.11 -0.68
1959:1 -0.78 -0.14 -1.07 0.30 0.13
1959:2 0.09 0.08 -1.68 0.69 1.00
1959:3 -1.04 0.29 -1.85 0.66 -0.13
1959:4 -1.58 0.42 -1.92 1.46 -1.54
1960:1 -1.60 -0.51 -0.92 0.71 -0.89
1960:2 -3.47 -1.06 -0.78 -0.67 -0.96
1960:3 -5.34 -2.28 -1.06 -1.69 -0.30
1960:4 -6.69 -2.39 -1.14 -1.72 -1.44
1961:1 -5.33 -1.93 -0.20 -1.65 -1.55
1961:2 -3.84 -1.95 -0.05 -0.92 -0.93
1961:3 -4.10 -2.13 0.12 -0.88 -1.21
1961:4 -1.95 -1.84 0.22 0.23 -0.56
1962:1 -0.09 -0.17 -0.59 0.54 0.13
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Table 2.A.2 (continued)
Date GNP Eg Es Em Ed
1962:2 -0.33 0.10 -0.99 0.38 0.17
1962:3 -1.15 -0.11 -0.66 -0.29 -0.10
1962:4 -2.39 0.08 -0.90 -1.02 -0.56
1963:1 -3.32 0.26 -1.36 -1.60 -0.62
1963:2 -2.71 0.06 -0.91 -1.42 -0.43
1963:3 -1.95 -0.03 -0.46 -1.20 -0.26
1963:4 -1.92 -0.03 -0.97 -0.76 -0.17
1964:1 -1.25 -0.70 -0.21 -0.18 -0.15
1964:2 -0.99 -0.38 0.01 -0.12 -0.50
1964:3 -0.76 -0.17 -0.15 -0.07 -0.37
1964:4 -1.01 -0.40 0.20 -0.05 -0.76
1965:1 0.34 -0.31 0.25 0.41 -0.01
1965:2 0.83 0.11 0.27 0.40 0.04
1965:3 1.16 0.22 0.34 0.05 0.55
1965:4 2.55 0.21 1.11 -0.28 1.51
1966:1 2.97 -0.09 0.85 -0.17 2.38
1966:2 2.06 -0.14 0.34 -0.16 2.02
1966:3 2.43 0.61 0.71 -0.08 1.19
1966:4 2.33 1.04 0.92 -0.71 1.08
1967:1 2.22 1.44 1.28 -1.36 0.85
1967:2 1.79 1.72 1.21 -1.88 0.74
1967:3 1.32 1.21 1.09 -2.22 1.24
1967:4 1.07 1.31 0.42 -1.77 1.10
1968:1 1.43 1.47 0.15 -1.09 0.90
1968:2 2.75 1.60 0.67 -0.50 0.98
1968:3 3.00 1.48 0.60 0.50 0.42
1968:4 2.57 1.13 0.20 0.97 0.27
1969:1 2.22 0.66 -0.10 1.51 0.14
1969:2 1.39 0.36 -0.35 1.98 -0.60
1969:3 0.44 -0.19 -0.44 1.82 -0.76
1969:4 -0.90 -0.79 -0.17 1.42 -1.35
1970:1 -1.76 -1.28 0.06 0.99 -1.52
1970:2 -2.69 -1.83 -0.05 0.63 -1.44
1970:3 -1.89 -1.09 0.19 0.28 -1.26
1970:4 -3.37 -1.32 0.14 -0.39 -1.79
1971:1 -1.04 -0.55 -0.01 0.04 -0.52
1971:2 -1.16 -0.22 -0.24 0.26 -0.95
1971:3 -0.94 -0.24 -0.15 1.38 -1.93
1971:4 -0.84 0.03 -0.02 2.07 -2.92
1972:1 0.08 -0.14 0.29 1.91 -1.98
1972:2 0.28 -0.65 0.86 1.84 -1.78
1972:3 0.57 -0.26 0.74 1.50 -1.40
1972:4 1.45 -0.30 1.53 1.05 -0.83
1973:1 3.28 -0.47 1.71 1.57 0.48
1973:2 1.98 -1.00 1.75 1.09 0.14
1973:3 2.00 -0.66 1.55 1.11 0.00
1973:4 2.19 -0.38 1.35 1.08 0.14
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Table 2.A.2 (continued)
Date GNP Eg Es Em Ed
1974:2 -0.46 -0.41 -0.18 0.44 -0.31
1974:3 -1.53 0.41 -1.05 -0.09 -0.81
1974:4 -4.78 -0.63 -2.35 -0.51 -1.30
1975:1 -6.75 0.13 -3.65 -0.30 -2.93
1975:2 -5.90 0.84 -2.88 0.00 -3.87
1975:3 -3.68 1.52 -2.63 0.60 -3.17
1975:4 -3.41 0.84 -2.7Jl 0.88 -2.43
1976:1 -1.96 1.49 -2.14 -0.28 -1.02
1976:2 -1.68 0.80 -1.14 -0.78 -0.56
1976:3 -1.23 0.91 -0.5][ -1.19 -0.44
1976:4 -0.92 0.65 0.33 -1.87 -0.04
1977:1 0.10 0.14 1.61 -2.01 0.36
1977:2 -2.03 -1.64 0.90 -1.75 0.46
1977:3 1.31 0.66 1.12 -1.21 0.74
1977:4 1.20 0.68 1.07 -0.81 0.27
1978:1 1.72 1.16 0.81 -0.49 0.23
1978:2 3.65 1.77 0.20 -0.23 1.90
1978:3 3.54 1.66 0.16 -0.11 1.83
1978:4 3.68 1.19 0.25 -0.29 2.53
1979:1 3.65 1.53 -0.0] -0.41 2.54
1979:2 2.47 0.73 0.00 -1.02 2.75
1979:3 2.55 0.17 0.04 -0.61 2.95
1979:4 2.10 0.26 0.52 -0.28 1.60
1980:1 1.83 0.29 0.10 -0.19 1.62
1980:2 -0.42 0.05 -0.45 0.42 -0.44
1980:3 -0.53 0.04 -0.53 -1.30 1.26
1980:4 0.25 -0.09 -0.66 -0.77 1.78
1981:1 2.05 0.27 -0.88 0.08 2.59
1981:2 1.00 0.36 -0.64 -1.05 2.32
1981:3 0.47 -0.21 -1.10 0.07 1.71
1981:4 -1.68 -0.03 -1.51 -0.76 0.61
1982:1 -3.30 -0.37 -1.04 -1.29 -0.58
1982:2 -2.69 -1.11 0.27 0.46 -2.30
1982:3 -4.26 -1.50 0.61 -0.69 -2.68
1982:4 -4.47 -1.41 1.14- -1.40 -2.80
Appendix 2.2
Construction ofthe Fiscal Indl~x G
The index is derived and discussed in Blanchard (1985). Its empirical
counterpart is derived and discussed in Blanchard (1983). This is a
short summary.
The Theoretical Index
The index measures the effect offiscal policy on aggregate demand
at given interest rates. It is given by:150 Olivier J. Blanchard/Mark W. Watson
G == A(B - JT e-(r+p)(s-t)ds) + Z t t t,s t ,
t
where Zt,Bt,Tt are government spending, debt, and taxes; Xt,s denotes
the anticipation, as of t, ofa variable x at time s.
The first term measures the effect offiscal policy on consumption;
Ais the propensity to consume out ofwealth. Bt is part ofwealth and
increases consumption. The presentvalue oftaxes,however, decreases
human wealth and consumption; taxes are discounted at a rate (r +
p), higher than the interest rate r. The second term captures the direct
effect ofgovernment spending.
The index can be rewritten as:
G = (Z - AJZ e-(r+p)(t-s)ds) t t t,s
t
+ A(B - J(T - Z )e-(r+p)(t-s)ds). t t,s t,s
t
This shows that fiscal policy affects aggregate demand through the
deviation ofspending from "normal" spending (first line), through the
level of debt and the sequence of anticipated deficits, net of interest
payments, Dt,s == (Zt,s - Tt,s)'
The Empirical Counterpart
We assume that any time t, D and Z are anticipated to return at rate
~ to their full employment values D*,L respectively. More precisely:
dZt,slds = ~(Z; - Zt,s)
dDt,slds = ~(D; - Dt,s).
The index becomes:
Gt = Zt - A(_I_Z; + 1 ~(Zt - Z;))
r+p r+p+
+ A(Bt + _1_ D; + 1 ~ (Dt - D;)).
r+p r+p+
From the study of aggregate consumption by Hayashi (1982), we151 Are Business Cycles All Alike?
choose A = .08, p = .05, r = .03. We choose ~ = .30 (all at annual
rates). This gives:
G, = .79(Z, - Z;) + .08B, + .21D, + .79D;.
Let Z, be the exponentially fitted trend for government spending.
The index used in the paper is G, = G,/z,. Time series for G, and its
components (Z, - Z;)IZ"B,/Z"D,/Z" D;IZ, are given in table 2.A.3.
Construction of the Fiscal Feedback Rule
Let g, z, z*, d, d*, I, and 1* be the unexpected components ofG, (ZI
Z), (Z*IZ), (DIZ), (D*IZ), (TIZ), and (TIZ). l~hey satisfy, therefore:
g = .79(z - z*) + .08b + .21d + .79d*.
Using d = z - I, d* = z* - 1* gives:
g = z - (.211 + .791*) -t- .08b.
Let y and p be, as in the text, the unexpected components of the
logarithms of GNP and of the price level. T'hen
dg = dz _ dt
.21 dy' dy dy
oand by construction, B being beginning of b d fi
.. dt*
as y e nltlon dy
db
quarter debt, dy = 0:
dg _ dz _
dp - dp
21 dt _ 79 dt* ~~ dz _ dl
. dp . dp dp dp ,
since the effect of unexpected price movements on actual and full
employment taxes is approximately the sanle.
Let 0"1, 0"2 be the elasticities of movements in government spending
with respect to unexpected movements in the level of output and in
the price level respectively. Let 8J, 82 be sirnilar elasticities for taxes.
Then:
dg = (0"1 - .21(1)dy
dg = (0"2 - 62)dp.
We assume that, within a quarter, there is no discretionary response
of g to either y or p. The response depends only on institutional ar-
rangements. We therefore use the results ofdeLeeuw et al. (1980) and
deLeeuw and Holloway (1982) to construct 0"1' 0"2' 8J, and 82•152 Olivier J. Blanchard/Mark W. Watson
0"1: From table 19 of deLeeuw et al. (1980), a one percentage point
increase in the unemployment rate increases spending in the first quarter
by 0.6% at an annual rate. From Okun's law it is reasonable to assume
that a 1% innovation in output reduces unemployment by roughly 0.1
percentage point in the first quarter. Putting these together we have 0"1
= -0.06.
0"2: G is composed of (1) purchases ofgoods and services, (2) wage
payments to government employees, and (3) transfer payments. There
is little orno effect ofunexpectedinflation onnominal purchases within
a quarter. Although parts of (2) and (3) are indexed, indexing is not
contemporaneous. Nominal payments for some transfer programs
(Medicare, Medicaid) increase with inflation. A plausible range for 0"2
is - 0.8 to - 1.0. We choose - 0.9 for the computations in the text.
61: We considered four categories oftaxes and income tax bases:(I)
personal income tax; (2) corporate income tax; (3) indirect business
taxes; (4) social security and other taxes.
We have
T; is available in deLeeuw et al. (1980), table 6, for selected years.
T
11YiY is available in ibid., table 8.
11TIYI is available in ibid., table 10.
11T2Y2 is available in ibid., 38, col. 1.
11T3Y3 is available in ibid., table 15.
11T4 Y4 is available in ibid., table 18.
We calculated 61 using elasticities and tax proportions for 1959 and
1979. The results were very close and yielded 61 = 1.4.
62: We considered the same four categories of taxes. In the same
way as before, we have
4 T.
82 = L T' 11T-Y· 11Y·P ;=1 I I I
i is available in deLeeuw et al. (1980), table 6.
11TjYj are given in deLeeuw and Holloway (1982), table 8. (They are
lower than the 11T;Y; reported above for the computations of 61.)
11y;p are given in ibid., table 7.
We calculated 62 using elasticities and tax proportions for 1959, 1969,
and 1979. The results were very close. A plausible range for 62 (de-153 Are Business Cycles All Alike?
Table 2.A.3 Fiscal Index and Its Components
Date G (Z-Z*)/Z BIZ DIZ D*IZ
1947:1 0.238 -0.003 7.788 -0.560 -0.533
1947:2 0.225 -0.003 7.521 - 0.515 -0.527
1947:3 0.280 -0.003 7.216 -0.396 -0.450
1947:4 0.141 -0.003 6.877 -0.523 -0.550
1948:1 0.165 -0.003 6.654 -0.466 -0.506
1948:2 0.253 -0.003 6.472 -0.373 -0.397
1948:3 0.354 -0.003 6.257 -0.248 -0.275
1948:4 0.408 -0.002 6.219 -0.186 -0.219
1949:1 0.447 0.002 6.212 -0.119 -0.191
1949:2 0.501 0.012 6.201 -0.030 -0.153
1949:3 0.513 0.020 6.144 -0.005 -0.145
1949:4 0.486 0.024 6.099 -0.007 -0.177
1950:1 0.582 0.017 6.071 0.007 -0.050
1950:2 0.347 0.009 5.976 -0.285 -0.252
1950:3 0.218 0.002 5.762 -0.474 -0.332
1950:4 0.171 0.000 5.596 -0.477 -0.367
1951:1 0.156 -0.002 5.353 -0.478 -0.352
1951:2 0.318 -0.006 5.258 -0.265 -0.187
1951:3 0.459 -0.006 5.187 - 0.111 -0.041
1951:4 0.466 -0.004 5.095 -0.056 -0.036
1952:1 0.424 -0.006 5.057 -0.093 -0.073
1952:2 0.490 -0.006 5.020 -0.014 -0.006
1952:3 0.551 -0.006 4.951 0.058 0.062
1952:4 0.505 -0.008 4.872 -0.015 0.034
1953:1 0.535 -0.009 4.834 0.000 0.074
1953:2 0.555 -0.009 4.808 0.033 0.094
1953:3 0.513 -0.009 4.768 0.022 0.049
1953:4 0.539 -0.002 4.757 0.129 0.048
1954:1 0.504 0.009 4.674 0.105 0.011
1954:2 0.431 0.012 4.626 0.035 -0.060
1954:3 0.409 0.014 4.605 0.009 -0.080
1954:4 0.361 0.010 4.539 -0.045 -0.114
1955:1 0.325 0.008 4.462 -0.104 -0.134
1955:2 0.276 0.003 4.394 -0.151 -0.170
1955:3 0.285 0.002 4.328 -0.148 -0.150
1955:4 0.250 0.002 4.246 -0.177 -0.175
1956:1 0.225 0.000 4.156 -0.175 -0.195
1956:2 0.225 0.002 4.067 -0.162 -0.188
1956:3 0.216 0.001 3.969 -0.151 -0.190
1956:4 0.194 0.001 3.884 -0.170 -0.202
1957:1 0.215 0.000 3.793 -0.139 -0.170
1957:2 0.224 0.000 3.730 -0.114 -0.158
1957:3 0.214 0.001 3.647 -0.114 -0.162
1957:4 0.236 0.008 3.621 -0.059 -0.152
1958:1 0.288 0.022 3.586 0.030 -0.119
1958:2 0.298 0.035 3.556 0.090 -0.130
1958:3 0.361 0.032 3.515 0.088 -0.042
1958:4 0.349 0.023 3.481 0.058 -0.037
1959:1 0.258 0.016 3.434 -0.033 -0.115
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Table 2.A.3 (continued)
Date G (Z-Z*)/Z BIZ DIZ D*IZ
1959:2 0.208 0.010 3.391 -0.092 -0.150
1959:3 0.220 0.011 3.360 -0.056 -0.142
1959:4 0.211 0.013 3.317 -0.061 -0.148
1960:1 0.106 0.0q9 3.261 -0.171 -0.241
1960:2 0.132 0.010 3.222 -0.126 -0.216
1960:3 0.150 0.012 3.176 -0.091 -0.198
1960:4 0.160 0.019 3.142 -0.059 -0.197
1961:1 0.195 0.023 3.116 -0.021 -0.163
1961:2 0.212 0.025 3.072 -0.012 -0.141
1961:3 0.201 0.021 3.029 -0.025 -0.142
1961:4 0.204 0.016 3.013 -0.042 -0.127
1962:1 0.241 0.012 2.976 -0.007 -0.081
1962:2 0.224 0.011 2.954 -0.025 -0.094
1962:3 0.210 0.011 2.936 -0.037 -0.107
1962:4 0.205 0.011 2.902 -0.030 -0.110
1963:1 0.181 0.012 2.874 -0.050 -0.132
1963:2 0.150 0.011 2.857 -0.087 -0.159
1963:3 0.162 0.009 2.834 -0.081 -0.141
1963:4 0.172 0.009 2.794 -0.068 -0.126
1964:1 0.206 0.008 2.767 -0.045 -0.085
1964:2 0.240 0.007 2.740 -0.011 -0.047
1964:3 0.196 0.005 2.705 -0.049 -0.086
1964:4 0.175 0.004 2.680 -0.063 -0.104
1965:1 0.142 0.003 2.639 -0.107 -0.128
1965:2 0.149 0.002 2.608 -0.103 -0.115
1965:3 0.212 0.000 2.575 -0.044 -0.046
1965:4 0.227 -0.001 2.537 -0.044 -0.022
1966:1 0.202 -0.002 2.488 -0.074 -0.037
1966:2 0.184 -0.002 2.436 -0.080 -0.052
1966:3 0.213 -0.003 2.399 -0.046 -0.019
1966:4 0.227 -0.004 2.361 -0.028 -0.001
1967:1 0.263 -0.003 2.332 0.022 0.035
1967:2 0.263 -0.004 2.310 0.027 0.037
1967:3 0.264 -0.004 2.274 0.028 0.042
1967:4 0.259 -0.003 2.279 0.019 0.037
1968:1 0.235 -0.003 2.278 -0.005 0.013
1968:2 0.257 -0.005 2.277 0.005 0.040
1968:3 0.195 -0.005 2.220 -0.057 -0.015
1968:4 0.166 -0.006 2.210 -0.077 -0.044
1969:1 0.100 -0.006 2.181 -0.144 -0.106
1969:2 0.091 -0.005 2.143 - 0.143 -0.113
1969:3 0.104 -0.005 2.050 - 0.112 -0.093
1969:4 0.095 -0.005 2.041 -0.101 -0.106
1970:1 0.110 -0.005 2.031 -0.070 -0.094
1970:2 0.164 -0.003 2.002 -0.004 -0.041
1970:3 0.169 0.002 1.958 0.003 -0.036
1970:4 0.179 0.006 1.950 0.032 -0.035
1971:1 0.188 0.011 1.953 0.021 -0.025
1971:2 0.210 0.013 1.917 0.050 -0.003155 Are Business Cycles All Alike?
Table 2.A.3 (continued)
Date G (Z-Z*)/Z BIZ DIZ D*IZ
1971:3 0.206 0:013 1.910 0.048 -0.007
1971:4 0.201 0.014 1.938 0.040 -0.015
1972:1 0.166 0.013 1.944 -0.006 -0.047
1972:2 0.207 0.012 1.92.3 0.025 0.000
1972:3 0.164 0.009 1.88.5 -0.017 -0.035
1972:4 0.230 0.007 1.869 0.040 0.038
1973:1 0.180 0.005 1.886 -0.032 -0.008
1973:2 0.159 0.004 1.871 -0.042 -0.028
1973:3 0.127 0.002 1.817 -0.065 -0.054
1973:4 0.128 0.001 1.772 -0.060 -0.048
1974:1 0.109 0.000 1.751 -0.056 -0.070
1974:2 0.118 0.001 1.707 -0.034 -0.059
1974:3 0.086 0.002 1.647 -0.044 -0.089
1974:4 0.106 0.006 1.60.5 0.003 -0.075
1975:1 0.146 0.019 1.584 0.076 -0.054
1975:2 0.327 0.037 1.599 0.242 0.112
1975:3 0.226 0.038 1.62.5 0.132 0.007
1975:4 0.218 0.037 1.638 0.122 0.000
1976:1 0.200 0.036 1.67.3 0.088 -0.017
1976:2 0.176 0.033 1.706 0.062 -0.042
1976:3 0.182 0.030 1.722 0.068 -0.035
1976:4 0.191 0.027 1.714 0.077 -0.022
1977:1 0.153 0.026 1.722 0.026 -0.056
1977:2 0.170 0.022 1.716 0.034 -0.032
1977:3 0.200 0.019 1.68.5 0.058 0.005
1977:4 0.188 0.018 1.699 0.051 -0.008
1978:1 0.175 0.014 1.699 0.037 -0.016
1978:2 0.139 0.010 1.687 -0.016 -0.043
1978:3 0.124 0.010 1.658 -0.028 -0.055
1978:4 0.118 0.008 1.644 -0.039 -0.057
1979:1 0.089 0.007 1.624 -0.062 -0.084
1979:2 0.068 0.005 1.59.3 -0.070 -0.101
1979:3 0.091 0.005 1.559 -0.048 -0.074
1979:4 0.103 0.006 1.550 -0.030 -0.063
1980:1 0.106 0.006 1.540 -0.022 -0.060
1980:2 0.117 0.0.3 1.518 0.019 -0.062
1980:3 0.125 0.019 1.491 0.035 -0.058
1980:4 0.110 0.018 1.487 0.020 -0.071
1981:1 0.062 0.021 1.468 -0.039 - 0.117
1981:2 0.063 0.027 1.480 -0.035 -0.124
1981:3 0.078 0.025 1.442 -0.019 -0.102
1981:4 0.099 0.020 1.434 0.024 -0.081
1982:1 0.099 0.028 1.446 0.041 -0.094
1982:2 0.099 0.035 1.458 0.043 -0.104
1982:3 0.146 0.046 1.449 0.094 -0.068
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pending on which 'TlTiYi are used) is 0.1 to 0.3. We choose 0.2 for com-
putations in the text.
Our fiscal policy rule is therefore: g = - .34y - 1.lp + eg •
Comment Robert J. Shiller
These are intriguing questions: Is the macroeconomy disturbed by very
large shocks occasionally orby small shocks regularly? Is there a single
source ofshocks to the economy, or are there many? Is the pattern of
behavior constant through time or changing? These questions are not
stated in terms ofan explicit model and seem to call for some sort of
exploratory dataanalysis. The authors have done this in an imaginative
and careful manner, showing thoughtful attention to methods. They
took the trouble to do Monte Carlo work to get empirical distributions
for statisticsfor which no distribution theoryis available, to use modem
robustregressiontechniquesinsteadoftheusualordinaryleastsquares,
and even to create newformal techniques thatcapture some motivation
ofpopular exploratory techniques.
They rightly perceive that to answer the questions posed here one
really would like to have a model of the propagation mechanism for
the shocks. Part oftheir work involves constructing such a model. The
model, however, is notused throughoutthe paper, and some techniques
used here are really in the nature of data description.
The authors refer to a "common framework ofanalysis" in modem
macroeconomics that uses stochastic difference or differential equa-
tions to model the propagationofshocks. This framework is notenough
by itselfto suggest any way ofstudying the kurtosis ofthe extraneous
shocks that strike the economy. We need to know more; we need to
know the structure of the model. We can, of course, observe the re-
siduals in an autoregression, as are shown in the authors' table 2.1.
But what do these residuals mean? Suppose the true model is a con-
tinuous time stochastic differential equation ofthe form dX!Xt
< = dWt
+ .5dl, where Wt is a unit Wiener process. Then X t = c*exp(Wt) is a
lognormal variable whose kurtosis increases with t. Heretheunderlying
shocks are all normal, butthe propagationmechanismcreatesa variable
X t with an arbitrarily high kurtosis. (The kurtosis ofa lognormal vari-
able goes to infinity as the variance ofthe underlying normal variable
is increased to infinity.)
Nor is there any way in the absence of a model to study whether
the economy is dominated by a single shock or by many shocks. Even
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if we knew that the vector X t is determined by a first-order vector
autoregression model, we might have problems. Suppose all compo-
nents of the vector error term were in fact zero except for the first;
that is, the economy is driven by a single shock. That is, X t = BXt - 1
+ Ut, where B is a matrix and Ut = [Ut" 0]. We could discover that Ut
has this specialform byregressingXt onXt-1andlookingatthe variance
matrix ofresiduals. However, if the special model holds for quarterly
data but we had semiannual datafor estimation, we would not observe
this special structure for the error term. 'With data for every other
quarter we would observe X t = B2Xt _ 2 + Vt, where V t = Ut + BUt-t.
In general, none ofthe elements of Vt will have zero variance.
The model presented here is therefore ofprimary importance to the
paper. The model is described not inappropriately as a "standard mac-
roeconomic model," though not all the c:oefficient restrictions are
"standard." The equations look something like standard textbook
equations with lagged endogenous variablt~s and error terms added.
The policy variables are represented by fiscal and monetary reaction
functions. The fiscal policy index g is unusual; it is a mixture ofgov-
ernment expenditure, the national debt, and the deficit.
How are the equations identified? The identifying restrictions are
almost those of the standard recursive model in which the matrix of
coefficients is triangular and the variance olatrix diagonal. Recall that
in that system the diagonality of the variance matrix is necessary for
identificationofall equations in the model. Also, in the recursive system
all equations can be estimated consistently by ordinary least squares.
This system differs from the recursive syste:m only in that the equation
that in the recursive system would contain only one endogenous vari-
able is an equation with three endogenous variables but with all ofthe
coefficients assumed known a priori. This equation is the fiscal policy
reaction function, the equation that determines g. The coefficients are
specified before estimation by a clever use of some institutional data
ongovernmentreactions. Now the model is identified, butthe equations
cannot be estimated by ordinary least squares. Since the matrix of
coefficients of the endogenous variables is not triangular, we must
instrument the regressions.
Even so, the assumption that the error terms are uncorrelated across
equations is necessaryfor identification. I wonderifthat is a reasonable
assumption. Where did the assumption COlne from? One way of ap-
preciating the arbitrariness ofsuch an assumption is to note that if the
model holds for monthly data, say, with errorterms uncorrelated across
equations, then the quarterly data will not generally have a represen-
tation with error terms uncorrelated across equations.
Since lack of correlation of residuals across equations was used to
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take linear combinations of these equations as we please so long as
these combinations do not violate zero restrictions on the coefficients.
The authors are concerned that the coefficient of M in the aggregate
demand equation has the wrong sign. One might, for example, add the
money supply equation to this equation, thereby rectifying the wrong
sign.
Another identifying assumption is that monetary policy does not
depend onthe contemporaryfiscal policy variable. Why is this omitted?
Does the Fed always ignore fiscal policy? How much trust do we wish
to place in the high kurtosis ofthe monetary policy error term shown
in table 2.4? Without the identifying assumptions above, the error term
in the monetary policy equation could be any linear combination ofthe
error terms in the other equations.
The assumptions used here for estimation might be compared with
those of Hall in this volume (chap. 4). Hall felt that he could find no
more than one truly exogenous variable for estimation ofsuch a model,
this variable being his military expenditure variable. The discussion of
his paper questioned whether even this variable was exogenous. The
assumed exogeneity here of residuals of equations lower in the hier-
archy is certainly even more questionable than the assumption made
by Hall.
The authors, inspired by the methods of Burns and Mitchell for
describing business cycles, offer a formalization oftheir approach. As
an exploratory technique, the Burns and Mitchell reference cycle ap-
proach has apparently had a wide appeal. It was a dominant theme in
empirical macroeconomics for at least a decade after their book ap-
peared in 1946, and the calculation of the reference cycle dates con-
tinues to be a widely publicized activity of the NBER. Like most
statistical methods belonging in the realm ofexploratory methods it is
controversial, and the motivations for the techniques are only intuitive.
Blanchardand Watson borrowedfrom the Burns and Mitchell approach
and also modified it.
It is interesting to see a formalization of the reference cycle dating
itself. It has sometimes been claimed that, while no simple formula is
used to date the reference cycle, in fact a recession is declared when-
ever real GNP shows two consecutive quarters of decline. Blanchard
and Watson have found that the quarter of a trough can be identified
instead as any quarter in which real GNP declined from the previous
quarter so that it is at least 0.5% below the previous peak and then
increased for the each ofthe next three consecutive quarters.
Rather than present the Burns/Mitchell charts of cyclical patterns
that were used tojudge the business cycle patternofseries, the authors
offer a summary measure. This measure is rather different from Burns
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time deformation that in effect reduced all cycles to the same length
and that depended only on the directions of change at various phases
of the cycle and not on their magnitude. l~he authors instead present
for each variable in each cycle five correlation coefficients: cross-
correlations between the variable and real GNP contemporaneously
and for two leads and lags. By fixing the leads and lags in terms of
quarters rather than fractions ofcycles, Blanchard and Watson's lead
or lag may be a much higher proportion ofthe cycle for short cycles,
such as that between 1960:2 and 1982:4, vlhich was only ten quarters
long. The authors' interpretation of the correlation coefficients relies
on a sort of approximation whose validity is not independent of the
length of the cycle. A procyclical variable will tend to show a corre-
lation pattern that is not quite flat. There is probably a tendency for
the peak ofthe specific cycle to occur, relative to the reference cycle,
as indicated by these leads orlags, but that is not necessarily so. There
is a fundamental difference between such correlation coefficients and
methods involving identification of peaks and troughs. For example,
all these correlations would be about zerofor any series that was ninety
degrees out ofphase with the business cyclle. These correlations would
stay zero if the series were to switch sign in another business cycle,
and so a dramatic change in the cyclical behaviorwould not be revealed
by a change in correlations.
The correlations seem to serve well enough, however, to show to
what extent the behaviors ofthe various s(~ries are directly "procycli-
cal" or "countercyclical." What is immediately apparent in looking at
the correlation coefficients is that there are not a lot ofregular patterns
to be seen. There is no series that shows a simple procyclical or coun-
tercyclical pattern in all seven cycles.
The authors characterize Burns and Mitchell (who studied cycles
between 1854 and 1933) as having found substantially less variation in
the cyclical pattern across cycles. That conclusion may be overstated.
In looking at the Burns and Mitchell pictures one usually finds for any
specific series at least one business cycle ~W'ith an anomalous pattern.
Only two of the Blanchard/Watson series appear to correspond ap-
proximately to series studied by Burns and :Mitchell: these are the long-
term and short-term interest rates. Plots very similar to those ofBurns
and Mitchell appear in the Zarnowitz/Moore paper, "Major Changes
in Cyclical Behavior" in this volume (chap. 9). Comparing their tables
9.3 and 9.6 with their tables 9.4 and 9.7 suggests that conformity to
the cycle has declined since World War II only for the short rate.
Both Blanchard and Watson and Zarnowitz and Moore find that short
rates are procyclical, show good conformity to the cycle, and lag the
reference cycle somewhat. Both papers find less conformity of long
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rate is countercyclical and tends to lead the business cycle by at least
two quarters. This last conclusion is not in Zarnowitz and Moore. One
might note that it hardly seems likely that the short rate should be
procyclical and the long rate countercyclical, since the two series are
fairly positively correlated. This points up some ofthe rather important
differences between the Zarnowitz/Moore and Blanchard/Watson ap-
proaches. The correlation patterns shown in Blanchard and Watson's
table 2.7 are not totally dissimilar for long and short rates, but their
identification ofleads orlags or procyclical orcountercyclical behavior
depends on which correlation coefficient is biggest in absolute value.
Ofcourse, a procyclical variable that leads the cycle by x degrees can
always be described as countercyclical and as leading the cycle by
180 - x degrees. With an average duration ofpostwar cycles ofabout
four years, such calculations suggest that the long rate leads by over
a year, which is beyond the range for which they computed correlation
coefficients. (They could not have computed correlation coefficients
out much further on all cycles, since one postwar cycle is only eleven
quarters long.)
The summary statistics provided by Blanchard and Watson, the dif-
ference between the maximum and minimum correlation coefficient
over the seven cycles, are generally above one for all series but the
shortrate. This documents theobservationthatfor most variables there
is at least one business cycle where the variable shows anomalous
behavior.
The authors rightly felt that some sort of significance test for the
statistic was desirable. They wanted to know whether differences of
this magnitude should be "surprising." They then computed for each
series an empirical distribution for this statistic for data generated ac-
cording to the estimated fourth-order bivariate autoregression repre-
sentation for the series and real GNP. Since the null hypothesis for this
test allows a bivariate autoregression process for which the pattern of
cycles may be either usually very similar across cycles or usually very
different across cycles, it is not clear in what sense we could expect
the power function for this test to divide important alternative
hypotheses.
Comment Peter Temin
The paper by Blanchard and Watson is extremely interesting. The
authors deserve our thanks for their efforts to take an informal con-
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troversy in the literature and endow it with enough shape to be testable.
As any historian knows, there are pitfalls in that process. But the effort
itselfis necessary, evenifitonly providesaforum forotherstodisagree.
By moving the discussion out ofthe realm ofslogans into the arena of
testable hypotheses, the authors have don(~ a great service.
The question in the title turns out to have two (related) meanings.
The obvious meaning, whether all business cycles look alike as they
develop, is treated in the second part of the paper. A more subtle
formulation, whether all business cycles have the same cause, is the
concern ofthe first part. After a briefcomment on the former topic, I
will concentrate on the latter.
Postwar business cycles, according to Blanchard and Watson, are
not all alike. But, they continue, little information is contained in their
differences. These differences do not indicate that business cycles are
caused by identifiable, discrete large shocks. It isjust that the economy
is not a tight enough system to force all fluctuations into a single fixed
mold. This result then poses a further question for us to ponder-
namely, whether the variance Blanchard and Watson found is truly
random or the result of a regular process more complex than their
model can capture.
Causationofbusiness cycles is treated in an elegant way. The authors
distinguish between proponents of so-called large-shock theories and
small-shock theories of business cycles. Large shocks by their nature
are identifiable and different one from another; they are the stuff of
economic history. Small shocks, by contrast, are nameless and indi-
vidually uninteresting. Itis only theirdistribution overtime thatmatters
for the origin ofcycles, which are then produced by the interaction of
the economy's internaldynamics and the ac~;umulationofsmall shocks.
The shocks that we observe are themselves, the authors imply, the
sum ofmany smaller shocks that we cannot even see in the data, much
less describe or verify from other sources.
My comments will deal both with the authors' methods and with
their conclusions. I will start with methodology and work toward
substance.
The first point follows from Blanchard and Watson's interpretation
of the imprecise distinction between large~ and small shocks. A dis-
covery that the distribution ofinnovations has fatter tails than a normal
distribution provides evidence of large shocks, in their parlance, but
it may not capture the earlier discussion. Disturbances large and in-
frequent enough not to be captured by a normal distribution may still
betoo small andfrequent to be notedby the proponents oflarge shocks.
In fact, independent one-quarter shocks may be too limited in time to
be countedas large. A different errorstructureand a different definition
oflarge might well produce a different answer.162 Olivier J. Blanchard/Mark W. Watson
The factual basis ofthis investigation consists ofprecisely four quar-
terly time series. There are casual references to the rest ofthe world,
but this is an exercise undertaken with strict rules. It is like classical
geometry, in which the student is limited to what he or she can prove
with straightedge and compass. Or like black-and-white photography
in which the drama of color is eschewed in favor of a concentration
on light and form. But since, unlike these two examples, there are no
generally accepted guidelines to indicate which "stylizedfacts" should
be included and which omitted, it is appropriate to ask if the use of
four series seems attractive.
One alternative can be rejected immediately. The use ofa large fore-
casting model would hopelessly complicate the issue without much
anticipation of gain. There are so many errors in those models, with
so many special properties, that a simple characterization of them as
coming from a simple, stationary distribution would be impossible.
Another alternative, though, appears more attractive. Why not five
series, or six? The gains are not as impressive as those claimed by Bob
Solow in the transition from one-sector to two-sector growth models,
but they may not be negligible either. The authors provide us with one
cautionary tale along these lines. They say that they cannot decompose
prices into raw materials prices and other prices in order to examine
more closely oil price shocks and related phenomena, because the
errors relating to those shocks cannot be disentangled from other price
shocks. The gain in information is only apparent, not real.
This argument does not seem, at least on its face, to be applicable
to the omission ofan interest rate, q, or other series reflecting the cost
ofcapital. I am prepared to hear that there are good statistical reasons
for omitting this kind of variable, but it gives me pause. True, the
aggregate demand equation is derived from IS and LM curves, and its
errors (innovations) are linear combinations of the errors in the un-
derlying IS and LM curves. If errors in these two relationships are
uncorrelated, little is lost. But if, as the authors suggest, there is a
tendency for innovations to cluster in time, the aggregate demand in-
novations will miss offsetting innovations in the fiscal and monetary
areas.
Blanchard and Watson, then, limit themselves to a simple aggregate
demand/aggregate supply model. There are two other equations, but
they do not provide additionaldetailaboutthefunctioning ofthe private
economy. They are policy feedback rules. So ifwe compare this model
with, say, Klein's simple models of the economy in the infancy of
modern econometrics, we discover two differences. First, as already
noted, it gives explicit attention to both fiscal and monetary innova-
tions, even ifinformation about them is limited. And second, it incor-
porates rules for government policy formation.163 Are Business Cycles All Alike?
The second differences affects the identification of shocks no less
than the first. Monetary and fiscal shocks are deviations from the as-
sumed rules ofbehavior, not from constancy or some smooth path over
time.
The policy rules are themselves of interest. The fiscal rule is cal-
culated, not estimated. It reveals a count,ercyclical fiscal policy: au-
tomatic stabilizers. The fiscal policy variable was constructed to show
various effects ofgovernment spending and debt. It contains a cyclical
component, andthe fiscal policy equationcanbe thoughtofas cleansing
it. That is, the equation for g separates the normal cyclical movements
offiscal policy variables from "true shocks." This seems like an awk-
ward process in which the cyclical components offiscal policy are first
built into g by construction and then removed again by calculation. It
was indicated, apparently, to distinguish changes in discretionary fiscal
policy from cyclical movements in the gove~rnmentbudget while allow-
ing both to influence subsequent events.
The monetary policy rule, by contrast, is estimated. It shows exactly
the opposite pattern. Whereas fiscal policy was "normally" counter-
cyclical, monetary policy was procyclical. It was, in other words, ac-
comodating. This is in itself an important conclusion. It may be an
accurate description ofmonetary policy in the immediate postwar years,
but it hardly seems to describe the role ofthe Fed in recent years. The
use of a single model for the entire period from 1947 through 1982
cannot uncover such a shift. It would be interesting to see what would
happen if the sample was broken at some point in time.
This procedure would provide information about changes both in
policy rules andin shocks. (Were the 1970s really worse thanthe 1960s?)
Ifthere was a structural shift midway through the sample, its absence
would tend to magnify the apparent shocks, particularly at the ends of
the period. An informal look at table 2.4 suggests that something like
this may indeed be going on.
Examining table 2.4 moves us from methodology to substance. As
Blanchard and Watson comment, the most striking feature oftable 2.4
(which shows the structural disturbances) is its lack ofintuitive appeal.
Despite considerable ingenuity, the authors succeed in making only one
positive identification between their calculated innovations and the
economic history of the postwar years (in 1974-75). I do not count
large disturbances of one sign followed irrlmediately by equally large
disturbances ofthe opposite sign or disturbances that can be assigned
to a known cause only by Procrustean tailoring ofthe date. There are
sixty large disturbances shown in table 2.4, and it would be surprising
if chance alone did not place a few of thern on the dates of historical
events. There does not seem to be much correlation between the cal-
culated disturbances and our historical memory.164 Olivier J. Blanchard/Mark W. Watson
This is due partly, no doubt, to the matterofdefinition and procedure
mentioned earlier. But to the extent that it is not, this result forces us
to choose between the formal history of Blanchard and Watson and
themore informal historyofEcksteinand Sinai. Howshouldonechoose?
To aid this choice, I compared the structural disturbances in table
2.4 with deviations of the four variables from simple time trends. The
differences are striking. The large disturbances oftable 2.4 do not look
autocorrelated. And the distributions of the four disturbances do not
appear very different. Compared with a time trend, however, the vari-
ables divide into two clear groups. M1 and the GNP deflator (m and
p) have highly autocorrelated disturbances, with little variation from
one quarterto the next. GNPand the fiscal index (y and g), by contrast,
have far less autocorrelation and far more quarter-to-quarter variation.
M1 and the GNP deflator grew slower than trend until the late 1960s
and faster thereafter. (If one were to break the sample into two, as
suggested earlier, the turning point of the later 1960s would be the
obvious break point.) Neither of the other variables seems to show a
break in trend at that time, although the fiscal variable appears to have
much larger (relative) variation than GNP.
This pattern can be discerned in Blanchard and Watson's table 2.3,
which decomposes forecast errors of their model. First, it is worth
noting that the policy innovations seem to have little effect on the rest
ofthe economy. Fiscal shocks affect the fiscal shock and nothing else
in the next quarter. Even after a year, they have almost no effect on
the other variables. And after five years, the effect ofpast fiscal shocks
on current fiscal shocks is over twice as large as its effect on any of
the other variables. Monetary shocks have exactly the same pattern.
After five years, there is some effect of monetary shocks on prices,
but the effect is only about halfas strong as the effect on money itself.
Second, there is a sharp separation between the effect ofsupply and
demand shocks. Supply shocks affect prices, and demand shocks affect
output. This is true in the next quarter and remains largely true after
a year. (Demand shocks have noticeable effects on prices by then,
although supply shocks still dominate.) Only after five years do prices
and income appear to be affected by a mixture ofinfluences.
In the short run, therefore, Blanchard and Watson's economy has a
roughly horizontal aggregate supply curve and a roughly vertical ag-
gregate demand curve. As the authors note, this conclusion is strongly
affected by their derivation from the fiscal equation. They present
alternative structural estimates of their model in appendix 2.1, based
on different calculated values ofthe price responsiveness ofthe fiscal
stimulus. They allow the coefficient ofp in the fiscal equation to vary
from 1.0 to 1.3. This makes the price coefficient in the supply equation
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ticular short-run characterization of the economy given by Blanchard
and Watson may not be the only reasonable description. This in turn
implies that the pattern ofvariances shown in table 2.3 may not be the
only one generated by reasonable constructions of the economy.
In the long run this model appears to give more conventional results,
showing the joint effect ofall the shocks cited. A note ofcaution may
be injected, however, in the use of a very simple model like this one
to project the effect oferrors over fifty years. The last section oftable
2.3 may only be telling us that the relations estimated in table 2.2 are
too simple to use in projecting an economy overfive years. The authors
use this kind ofmodel to look at the short-run errors; there is no reason
to think it is the bestway to approach problern.s oflonger-runforecasting.
Blanchard and Watson therefore seem to be presenting us with an
economy that, at least in the short run, decomposes into several rather
independent subeconomies. This surely is different from the economy
described by Eckstein and Sinai. It also may well depend on the par-
ticular derivation used, as suggested by the alternatives furnished in
appendix 2.1. The principal issue they raise, therefore, may not be
whether shocks to the economy are generated by a normal distribution,
but rather whether the short-run responsiveness of the economy has
the simple structure they have attributed to it.
Discussion Summary
The discussion began with a response by Sims to Shiller's comments
regarding identification and exogeneity. Sims stated that the identifi-
cation of any stochastic model requires that restrictions be placed on
the model's error process. Usually investigators make assumptions
about the exogeneity ofcertain variables enteringthe model. Blanchard
and Watson's approach, however, is to regard nothing as totally ex-
ogenous. This forces them to turn to exclusion restrictions and explicit
assumptions on the error terms, in particular a diagonal covariance
matrix for the contemporaneous shocks, to achieve identification. Shill-
er's point that the use of the wrong sampling period can induce con-
temporaneously correlated errors applies equally to incorrect identi-
fying restrictions. Such a criticism does not mean that identification
should not be attempted; it means only that identifying restrictions
should be used wisely, as Blanchard and Watson have done. Finally
Sims drewattentionto the sophisticatedextensionofVARmethodology
used by this paper. A vector autoregression was first used to generate
"reduced form" residuals. Robust simultaneous equation estimation166 Olivier J. Blanchard/Mark W. Watson
techniques were then used to transform the reduced-form shocks into
shocks arising from a structural model.
Although McCallumfelt thatthelarge-shock versus small-shockview
of impulses was valuable, he questioned the authors' statements on
the associated policy implications. McCallum said he could see no
reason why the presence ofsmall shocks necessarily supported policy
rules or why large shocks necessarily led to a need for discretionary
policy. In reply, Blanchard referred McCallum to the debate between
Robert Lucas and Robert Solow in Rational Expectations and Eco-
nomic Policy (Fischer 1980, 249-64). Blanchard felt that the prevailing
view ofthe profession, as espoused by Solow, seemed to be that large
shocks were unique events whose source could be readily identified
and counterbalanced with specific policies. The sources of small per-
turbations were harder to isolate, and this argued for built-in automatic
stabilizers to offset their effects. Finally, several participants remarked
that there might be difficulties in differentiating between true small
shocks and a large shock that came in as a succession ofsmall shocks
because of the choice of the sampling interval. Blanchard conceded
that this was a,potential problem, but held that the eight-quarter fore-
cast decompositions ofGNP presented in table 2.A.2 did not seem to
indicate that this was the case here.
Additional Contribution
Are Business Cycles Symmetrical?
J. Bradford DeLong and Lawrence H. Summers
1. Introduction
The dating of peaks and troughs and the concomitant emphasis on
the different qualitative mechanisms involved in cyclical expansions
and contractions have been major features of the NBER program on
business cycle research. Asymmetry between expansions and con-
tractions has long been a focus ofsuch research. Thus Wesley Mitchell
wrote (1927), "the most violent declines exceed the most considerable
advances .... Business contractions appear to be a briefer and more
violent process than business expansions." Keynes wrote in the Gen-
eral Theory (1936) that "the substitution ofa downward for an upward
tendency often takes place suddenly and violently. . . no such sharp
J. Bradford DeLong is a graduate student in the Department ofEconomics at Harvard
University. Lawrence H. Summers is professor of economics at Harvard University.
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turning point occurs when an upward is substituted for a downward
tendency." Indeed Neftci (1984) states that "the claim that major eco-
nomic time series are asymmetric over different time phases of the
business cycle arises in almost all major works on business cycles."
In many respects the techniques of modern statistics and econo-
metrics surely supersede earlier methods of cyclical analysis. They
make possible the application of techniques of statistical estimation
and inference. They remove the need for judgment in data description.
And they provide a rigorous basis for nOQjudgmental forecasting. Yet
statistical models of the sort used in economics-whether built in the
structural spirit ofthe Cowles Commission orin the modern time series
tradition-are entirely unable to capture cyclical asymmetries. If, as
Keynes, Mitchell, and others belived, cyclical asymmetries are offun-
damental importance, then standard statistiical techniques are seriously
deficient. Something like traditional business cycle analysis may then
benecessary toprovideanadequateempiri(;al basisfortheorizingabout
cyclical behavior.
Hence the question ofthe magnitude ofcyclical asymmetries seems
to be ofsubstantial methodological importance. Yet with the exception
ofthe work ofNeftci (1984), it appears to have attracted relatively little
attention. This paperexamines the extentofcyclical asymmetries using
American data for the prewar and postwar periods and data on five
othermajor OECD nations for the postwarperiod. We find no evidence
ofasymmetry in the behavior ofGNP or industrial production. For the
United Statesonly, we find evidence ofsome asymmetryin the behavior
ofunemployment. We conclude that asymInetry is probably not a phe-
nomenon of first-order importance in understanding business cycles.
It appears that there is not much basis for preferring some version of
traditional cyclical techniques ofanalysis and forecasting to more sta-
tistical methods.
Section 2 ofthis note describes our methods and presents the results
of our analysis of GNP and industrial production. Section 3 follows
Neftci (1984) in considering unemployment. We note some method-
ological problems we have with his analysis and then show that his
conclusions about the behavior ofunemployment appear to be invalid
outside the United States. Section 4 provides some brief conclusions.
2. Asymmetries in Output?
The essence of the claims of Keynes and Mitchell quoted in the
previous section was that economic downturns are brief and severe
relative to trend, whereas upturns are longer and more gradual. This
hypothesis has a clearimplication: there should be significant skewness
in a frequency distribution ofperiodic gro\vth rates ofoutput. That is,
the distribution should have significantly fewer than half its observa-168 Olivier J. BlanchardIMark W. Watson
tions below the mean; and the average deviation from the mean ofthe
observations below the mean should be significantly more than the
average deviation of the observations above the mean. The median
output growth rate should exceed the mean by a significant amount.
Figure C2.1 depicts the predicted frequency distribution ofoutput growth
under the null hypothesis of symmetry and under the alternative hy-
pothesis of Keynes and Mitchell.
Ourprocedure is simple: it is to calculate the coefficient ofskewness
ofthe distribution ofoutput growth rates for a variety ofoutput mea-
sures and time intervals. The coefficient ofskewness is defined as the
ratio ofthe third centeredmomentto the cubeofthe standarddeviation.
For a symmetric distribution, the coefficient of skewness is zero, and
the mean equals the median.
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Fig. C2.1 Standardized (zero mean and unit variance) distribution with
zero and unit skewness, respectively.169 Are Business Cycles All Alike?
Evaluation ofthe statistical significance ofany measured deviations
from symmetry clearly requires an estimate ofthe sampling variability
in our estimates ofskewness. Standard statistical works such as Ken-
dall and Stuart (1969) note that under the null hypothesis ofzero skew-
ness, the estimated skewness ofa set ofn independent random normal
observations is normally distributed with a standard error of (6/n)V2•
Unfortunately, the observations on growth rates considered here are
highly serially correlated, and so this formula is inapplicable. We there-
fore used the following Monte Carlo procedure for each series and
sample period considered. First, a third-order autoregression process
was estimated for the time series ofgrowth rates. It was then used to
generate three-hundred artificial series for the sample period under the
assumptionthatthe shocks to the autoregressionprocess were normally
distributed. The standard deviation of the lestimated skewness under
the null hypothesis was then used calculated as the standard deviation
of the skewnesses ofthe artificially generated series. l
Table C2.1 presents some evidence on skewness in quarterly and
annual growth rates of United States GNP and industrial production
Table C2.1 Skewness of United States GNP and Industrial Production Growth
Rates
Annual Data Quarterly Data
Standard Standard
Variable Period Skewness Error Skewness Error
GNP 1891-1915 - .47 .73 .55 .29
GNP 1923-40 - .70 1.12 .04 .42
GnP 1949-83 -1.37 .74 -.33 .29
IP 1949-83 - .55 .68 -.58 .40
Source: Data from Gordon 1982 and from the 1984 Business Conditions Digest.
1. We verified that the estimated skewnesses were approximately normally distributed.
Coefficients of kurtosis were less than 10% away frotTI their value of three under the
null hypothesis. Note that our test of asymmetry is appropriate if output is stationary
either when detrended or when differenced. Our standard errors are calculated under
the second assumption, which is weakly supported by ~~elsonand Plosser 1982. Because
they include periods in their analysis like the Great Depression and World War II, during
whichnoone wouldexpectthe underlyingrateofgrowthoftheeconomyto stayconstant,
it is hard to interpret how their warnings against the practice of detrending apply to
analyses that deal only with periods for which one has good reason to suspect that the
underlying growth of potential output has been approximately constant.
Forthe United Statesindustrialproductionindex, estimated skewnessesfor subperiods
of the post-World War II period are highly variable-Inore variable than the stochastic
errors calculated under the assumption of an AR(3) generating process would suggest.
Apparently, modeling the generating process as an AR(3) does not capture all the serial
dependence in the series and leads to estimated standard errors that are presumably too
low. Therefore the standard errors reported in this paper are probably below their actual
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for various sample periods. We use industrial production as well as
GNP because the latter contains a greater number of imputed series,
and because cyclicality is most apparent in the manufacturing sector
of the economy. Because using quarterly data is complicated by the
need for seasonal adjustment and by high-frequency movements that
might render existing skewness undectable, both annual and quarterly
data are examined.
Very little evidence of significant asymmetries emerges. Before World
War II, quarterly GNP growth rates exhibit positive skewness, the
opposite of that implied by the hypotheses of Keynes and Mitchell.
Thefailure ofthe steep 1929-33 decline to dominate the interwarperiod
is somewhat surprising. We expected significant skewness to be most
apparent around the Great Depression. Similar conclusions are ob-
tained with annual GNP data and with data on annual industrial pro-
duction for the prewar period. Asymmetries do not appear to be sub-
stantial enough to be important. The difference between the median
and mean growth rates reaches a maximum of 0.3% using quarterly
data on industrial production for the postwar period. This difference
is only 2% of the interquartile range of the distribution of quarterly
growth rates: it is a very small number.
There is a little bit ofevidence in favor ofskewness in postwar data.
All the estimated skewnesses are negative, as predicted by Keynes and
Mitchell. In the case of annual GNP data, the estimated skewness
approaches statistical significance. However, no equivalent result is
found with either quarterly GNP or annual industrial production data.
Hence we are inclined to discount its significance. It is ofcourse pos-
sible that with longer time series significant asymmetries would emerge-
the estimate of skewness would become sharper. But as figure C2.2
reveals, the observed skewness does not appear to be substantively
important. The nakedeyecannoteasilyjudgethedirection ofasymmetry.
As a further check, table C2.2 reports estimated skewnesses ofquar-
terly GNP and industrial production for other major OECD countries
for the postwar period. Skewness is noticeably negative for only two
of the five countries-Canada and Japan-using either industrial pro-
duction or GNP data. There is no significant evidence of asymmetry
for any country. The only natural grouping suggested by the data is a
possible division into the United States, Canada, and Japan on the one
handandthe United Kingdom, France, and West Germanyontheother.
But this possible difference between "non-European" and "Euro-
pean" business cycles is not strongly enough present in the data to
give us any confidence that it is anything more than the workings of
chance.
How has the picture of recessions as short violent interruptions of
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Fig. C2.2 Histogram of quarterly GNP growth rates, 1949-82.




Country Skewness Error Skewness Error
United States -.61 .42 - .33 .29
Japan -.66 .40 -.43 .29
Canada -.52 .39 -.42 .30
West Germany -.01 .34 -.11 .26
United Kingdom .13 .35 .61 .27
France .27 .33 -.03 .24
Source: Datafrom the OECD HistoricalStatistics andfrom the 1984 Business Conditions
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Fig. C2.3 DeviationofUnited States GNPfrom its natural rate. NBER
reference cycle recessions shaded.
the way economic data are frequently analyzed. Figures C2.3 and C2.4
depict the NBER reference cycles, contractions are definitely shorter
than expansions, confirming the judgments of Keynes and Mitchell.
But this is a statistical artifact. The superposition ofthe business cycle
upon a trend of economic growth implies that only the most severe
portions ofthe declines relative to trend will appearas absolute declines
and thus as reference cycle contractions. Even a symmetric business
cycle superimposed on a rising trend would generate reference cycles
for which the recessions would be short and severe relative to trend,
even though the growth cycles-the cycles in detrended indexes-
wouldbe symmetric. As this argument suggests, there is little difference
between the lengths ofgrowth cycle expansions and contractions. The
difference in length between expansions and contractions for the nine173 Are Business Cycles All Alike?












Fig. C2.4 DeviationofUnited States GN"P from its natural rate. NBER
growth cycle recessions shadf~d.
growth cycles averaged 0.9 quarters; the standard deviation of this
estimate ofthe average is 1.4 quarters.2 By contrast, the average length
ofthe seven reference cycle expansions was 11.4 quarters longer than
the length ofthe subsequent contractions.3
We conclude from this investigation that once one takes proper ac-
count of trend growth-using either our sk,ewness-based approach or
2. We are assuming that each postwar business cycle is an independent draw from a
population characterized partly by the difference in le:ngth between the expansion and
the recession phase. Cycle dates are taken from Moore and Zarnowitz's "The Devel-
opment and Role ofthe National Bureau ofEconomic Research's Business Cycle Chro-
nologies" (appendix A to this Volume). Note that, as Moore and Zamowitz report, it
was not always the case that expansions were as a rule longer than contractions.
3. With a standard error ofthe mean of3.3 quarters. Excluding the highly anomalous
1961-70 reference cycle, the mean difference is 8.1 quarters, and its standard error is
1.8 quarters.174 Olivier J. Blanchard/Mark W. Watson
the traditional NBER cycle dating approach-little evidence remains
ofcyclical asymmetry in the behavior ofoutput. The impression to the
contrary that we used to hold seems to result from a failure to take
account either imrpessionistically or quantitatively of the effects of
long-run economic growth. Few extant theories suggest that business
cycles should depend on the rate of underlying growth of either pro-
ductivity or population.4 The next section considers whether similar
conclusions are obtained using data on unemployment.
3. Asymmetries in Unemployment?
Our conclusions so far contradict those of Neftci (1984), who ex-
amines the behavior ofthe unemployment rate and finds evidence against
the null of symmetry at the .80 level. Neftci's statistical procedure
seems inappropriate to us: eliminating the quantitative information in
the data by reducing it to a series of ones (unemployment increasing)
and zeros (unemployment decreasing) cannotlead to a testofmaximum
power.
Table C2.3 presents estimates of the skewness in detrended unem-
ployment rates for the United States and other major OECD countries
for the postwar period. We examine only the postwar data because
earlier unemployment estimates are in general not derived indepen-
dently from output data. For the United States, we confirm Neftci's
conclusion. Indeed, we are able to reject the null hypothesis of sym-
metry at the .95 level. Annual data suggest as much skewness as quar-
terly data, butthe skewness in annual datais not statistically significant.
None of the other OECD countries, however, have statistically sig-
nificant skewnesses in their detrended unemployment rates.5 This sug-
gests that skewness in the United States is either a statistical accident
or a result of a peculiarity in the United States labor market. Asym-
metry in changes in unemployment rates is not a strong general feature
of business cycles.
We have briefly attempted to examine the reasons for asymmetry in
American unemployment rates. Skewness does not arise from the be-
havior of labor force participation: labor force participation rates ex-
hibit no noticeable skewness, and skewness is present in detrended
4. But see Schumpeter 1939 for arguments that the cyclical variance ofoutput is itself
positively related to the rate of long-run growth.
5. Detrending European unemployment rates is not easy: there appears to have been
an enormous rise in structural unemployment rates all over Europe in the past ten years.
The results reported used a second-degreee polynomial to detrend the data. The results
were effectively unchanged when a third- or a fourth-degree polynomial was used or
when a piecewise linear trend with a breakpoint in 1973 was used. If the rise in unem-
ployment is attributed entirely to cyclical factors-if the skewness of raw changes is
calculated-then changes in European unemployment rates since 1970 appear strongly
skewed.175 Are Business Cycles All Alike?
Table C2.3 Skewness of Quarterly Changes in Unemployment Rates, 1950-79
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Fig. C2.5 United States industrial production and unemployment,
1948-80.
unemployment numbers as strongly as in detrended unemployment
rates. Moreover, quarterly changes in employment over the period
1949-82 exhibit a skewness coefficient of - 1.90, significant at the .95
level. Skewness in employment and unemployment but not in GNP
clearly indicates a breakdown in Okun's law. In figure C2.5, inverted176 Olivier J. Blanchard/Mark W. Watson
deviations ofindustrial production from trend are plotted alongside the
detrended unemployment rate. At business cycle peaks-unemploy-
ment troughs-the unemployment rate lags behind output measures.
Output measures startto decline relative to trend before unemployment
starts to rise. There is a period of time, after the growth cycle peak
and before the reference cycle peak, during which output is falling
relative to trend and employment is still rising relative to trend. This
discrepancy in timing appears only near business cycle peaks. At busi-
ness cycle troughs, the unemployment rate peaks within one quarter
of the trough of output measures.
The significant coefficient of skewness found in the United States
unemployment rate is apparently another manifestation ofthe "end of
expansion" productivity effect documented in Gordon (1979). Accord-
ing to Gordon, normal equations for raw labor productivity go awry in
the quarters after output reaches its maximum relative to trend. The
magnitude ofthis effect can be seen in Gordon's figure 1 (reprinted as
fig. C2.6). Output has begun to fall relative to trend; employment is
still rising relative to trend; and so raw labor productivity naturally
declines sharply. Firms are able to expand their work forces rapidly
after business cycle troughs in order to keep pace with rising aggregate
demand. Why don't they contract their work forces relative to trend
after growth cycle peaks? We suspect that there is an explanation
related to the burgeoning literature on labor hoarding (see Medoff and
Fay 1983 or Fair 1984, for example), but it is beyond our competence
to suggest here what the explanation might be.
4. Conclusion
Our investigation into the possible asymmetry ofthe business cycle
has, in our estimation, failed to turn up significant evidence that the
econometric model building approach to business cycles is misguided.
We could not find the skewness coefficients we thought we would find;
and we therefore conclude that it is reasonable in a first approximation,
to model business cycles as symmetric oscillations about a rising trend.
GNPgrowthrates andindustrialproductiongrowthrates do notprovide
significant evidence of asymmetry. We therefore think that the main
advantage of the econometric model building approach-the body of
statistical theory behind it-makes it the methodology of choice for
analyzing macroeconomic fluctuations.
Our results call into question at least one possible justification for
using reference cycles in studying macroeconomic fluctuations. An
alternative justification for the reference cycle approach stresses the
commonality of the patterns of comovements in variables across dif-
ferent business cycles. Blanchard and Watson's paper challenges this
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Fig. C2.6 Output per hour in the nonfarrrl business sector, actual and
predicted from alternative equations, 1969:2 to 1979:3. Re-
printed from Gordon 1979.178 Olivier J. Blanchard/Mark W. Watson
cycle approach are the foundation of empirical macroeconomics. But
given the availability of modem statistical methods, there appears to
be no scientific basis for the use of reference cycles in either macro-
economic analysis orforecasting. As yet, no phenomenon or regularity
has been adduced that can be studied using the reference cycle ap-
proach but is inconsistent with the assumptions ofstandard time series
methods. Until such a demonstration is provided, there is little justi-
fication for the continued use of reference cycles in studying or fore-
casting macroeconomic fluctuations.
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